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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Thesis:  Perpetuating Inefficacy: Comparing Counterterrorism Policies in the 
Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations 
 
Thesis Advisor: Professor Evelyn Alsultany 
 
 
How have the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations’ security policies framed the role of 
liberty in counterterrorism efforts, and what are the implications of such policies on Arab and 
Muslim Americans’ civil liberties? This thesis argues that despite the different approaches of 
each Administration, due to flawed foundations and a lack of strategic oversight during 
implementation, their respective leading domestic counterterrorism policies were ineffective and 
encroached upon Arab and Muslim Americans’ liberties. The Bush Administration focused on 
preemptive measures that removed judicial barriers and expedited the investigation process. The 
USA PATRIOT Act investigations were disproportionately directed at foreign nationals from 
Arab and Muslim-majority countries, but this approach resulted in few convictions and restricted 
basic civil liberties. The Obama Administration shifted its focus away from punishment, and 
toward partnership with Arab and Muslim American communities by focusing on counter-
radicalization efforts with the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program. CVE’s lack of 
strategic regulation and reliance on the disproven radicalization theory, however, proved to 
undermine its objectives and alienate a population. Finally, the Trump Administration’s Travel 
Ban attempts to bar individuals from particular countries from entering the United States. In 
doing so, the Trump Administration established a counterproductive security effort that creates 
grounds for terrorist recruitment, alienates Muslims, and undermines relationships with Middle 
Eastern allies. This thesis compares the efficacy of the Bush, Obama, and Trump 
Administrations’ leading domestic counterterrorism policies, and exposes implications of 
ineffective security methods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 ii	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perpetuating Inefficacy:  
Comparing Counterterrorism Policies in the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations 
 
 
By 
Julia Sofo 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the College of Literature, Science, & Arts 
at the University of Michigan in partial fulfillment 
for the requirements for the degree 
of Bachelor of Science 
(International Studies with Honors) 
2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis Committee: 
 
 Professor Evelyn Alsultany 
 Doctor Anthony Marcum 
 
	 iii	
Acknowledgements 
 
 I would like to extend my gratitude to all of the individuals who supported me throughout 
this process. Without your help, I would have never been able to accomplish this. 
 First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Evelyn Alsultany, for 
working with me throughout the year. You are truly an inspiring professor who provided me with 
the inspiration to pursue this project. I greatly admire your passion for the subject and your 
devotion to solidarity and unity. As for Dr. Anthony Marcum, thank you for guiding me through 
this process, and for helping to bring out the best in my writing. Your dedication to working with 
your students is astonishing, it is no wonder you are so respected.  
 Thank you to all of my friends for listening to me talk about my thesis endlessly. 
Whether it was offering encouraging words, or spending long nights in the law library next to 
me, it is comforting and motivating having such a strong support system. And finally, to my 
family, who has supported me throughout my entire life and academic career, and who has 
taught me to always strive to be my best. I would be nowhere without your love and 
commitment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 iv	
Table of Contents 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... iii 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. v 
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
I. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 1 
II. The United States’ Complicated Role in the Middle East During the 20th Century ................... 3 
III. Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America ..................................................................................... 7 
IV. Literature Review ............................................................................................................................. 8 
V. Methodology ..................................................................................................................................... 13 
VI. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 14 
Chapter 2: The Bush Administration and the USA PATRIOT Act ...................................... 16 
I. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 16 
II. A New Approach to Counterterrorism .......................................................................................... 17 
III. An Analysis of The USA PATRIOT Act ...................................................................................... 18 
IV. Impact on Arab and Muslim American Communities ............................................................... 33 
V. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 35 
Chapter 3: The Obama Administration and Countering Violent Extremism ...................... 37 
I. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 37 
II. A Shift in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy .................................................................................... 38 
III. An Analysis of the Countering Violent Extremism Program .................................................... 39 
IV. Impact on Arab and Muslim American Communities ............................................................... 55 
V. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 56 
Chapter 4: The Trump Administration and the Travel Ban .................................................. 58 
I. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 58 
II. A Controversial Counterterrorism Policy ..................................................................................... 59 
III. An Analysis of the Travel Ban ...................................................................................................... 60 
IV. Impact of the Travel Ban ............................................................................................................... 72 
V. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 77 
Chapter 5: Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 78 
I. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 78 
II. Comparison of the Security Policies .............................................................................................. 78 
III. Factors for Policymakers to Consider .......................................................................................... 85 
IV. Implications for the Future ........................................................................................................... 87 
Works Cited ................................................................................................................................. 89 						
	 v	
List of Tables 
Table	1:	Methodology	.......................................................................................................................	17	
 
 																		
 	
 
 		
	 1	
Chapter 1: Introduction 
I. Introduction  
 
 On September 11, 2001, nineteen members of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda 
hijacked four U.S. planes and conducted the deadliest terrorist attack on American soil. The 
North and South Towers of the World Trade Center in Manhattan were intentionally struck, both 
falling within 102 minutes of the first plane hitting. A plane leaving from Virginia flew into the 
Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The fourth, and final plane, crashed into a field near Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania; officials believe that the passengers attempted to retake the plane to prevent it 
from reaching a third target. A total of 2,753 people were killed in the attacks (CNN Library, 
2017). This day has come to symbolize both loss and unity for Americans. To support the 
nation’s unity and strength, the government was tasked with a daunting challenge: protect its 
citizens from another terrorist attack by a seemingly interminable enemy.   
In an attempt to conceptualize the motivations for such an attack, the Bush 
Administration provided the public with a simple, yet powerful reason for why terrorists would 
attack the United States: “they hate us for our freedoms” (Bush, 2001). Furthering a precedent 
that began in the 20th century, the government portrayed the United States as an innocent actor 
and Islam as the enemy. The government established a “with us or against us” binary that both 
neglected the United States’ own complicated role in the geopolitical events leading up to 9/11 
and ignored the causes of terrorism.  
This thesis evaluates the strategy through which the United States government attempted 
to address terrorism by looking at the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations’ 
counterterrorism policies from October 2001 to January 2018. I will answer the questions: How 
have the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations’ security policies framed the role of liberty 
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in counterterrorism efforts, and what are the implications of such policies on Arab and Muslim 
Americans’ civil liberties? I argue that although the strategies of each Administration differed, 
the respective policies’ flawed foundations and lack of oversight during implementation resulted 
in ineffective security measures that framed Arab and Muslim Americans as a scapegoat in the 
War on Terror and threatened their liberties.  
Almost two decades after the September 11th attacks, the War on Terror continues to be 
at the forefront of American foreign and domestic policy. These counterterrorism policies have 
evolved throughout the past three presidencies, but have maintained an inefficient and divisive 
nature. With the Travel Ban to be ruled on by the Supreme Court in June 2018, policymakers 
must consider the path that the United States has followed since 2001, and whether this is a path 
that the country should continue on. This thesis offers a lens for evaluating the ineffectiveness of 
previous counterterrorism policies and their damaging implications on civil liberties. In such an 
open-ended state of emergency, examining the government’s response to terrorism is vital, as it 
demonstrates that unity is a more powerful tool than incrimination.   
This chapter situates the post-9/11 discourses and discussions of terrorism and the Middle 
East into a larger historical context. First, the chapter analyzes the United States’ developing 
relationship with the Middle East and terrorism in the 20th century. It discusses how the 
government has repeatedly characterized the United States as an innocent actor, Islam as the 
enemy to be conquered, and counterterrorism as the solution to the problem. The next section 
briefly explains each administration’s counterterrorism approach. The chapter then reviews the 
current literature on the topic, specifically addressing the role of liberty in security policies and 
the impact of such policies on the Arab and Muslim American community.  
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II. The United States’ Complicated Role in the Middle East During the 20th Century 
 
 Examining the United States’ involvement in the Middle East in the decades preceding 
2001 offers a critical vantage point to understanding the American public and government’s 
responses to 9/11. Throughout the 20th century, various administrations neglected to account for 
the government’s persistent military participation in the region and support of Islamist groups, 
which furthered the narrative of the United States as a blameless actor in geopolitics. The 
government’s continued short-term memory regarding its role in the Middle East, however, has 
diminished the effectiveness of counterterrorism responses in the War on Terror.  
In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt instigated a new wave of Middle East relations 
by meeting with the Saudi King to gain access to the region’s oil. In exchange, the United States 
pledged to modernize the country’s social and security sectors, and Saudi Arabia was able to 
alleviate some of its dependence on Great Britain (Kumar, 2012). The relationship between the 
U.S. and the Middle East progressed with the United States’ rapid exit from its Middle East 
campaign at the end of WWII, because it forced Great Britain and the Soviets to withdraw their 
troops as well (Khalidi, 2005). These interactions were some of the earliest signifiers of the 
United States’ relationship with the Middle East, as they initiated a narrative of the United States 
as the advanced modernizer and the Middle East as a dependent region founded in tradition 
(Kumar, 2012). The U.S. government sustained this binary throughout the 20th century, and 
continued to use it as a means of characterizing itself as the benevolent actor in geopolitical 
events. 
In the mid-1940s, the Middle East began to see the United States in a new light. After 
President Truman’s rapid and unrelenting recognition of Israel in 1948, the Middle East grew 
steadily more disappointed in the United States. This frustration grew through the early stages of 
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the Cold War when the United States established military bases throughout the Middle East in an 
effort to contain Soviet advances (Khalidi, 1945). As a result of this Cold War strategy, and in an 
attempt to maintain access to oil, the Middle East became a solidified focal point in U.S. foreign 
policy. 
This new focus was furthered by the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines, which provided 
economic and military assistance to Middle Eastern countries. The United States quietly 
supported Islamist organizations as a counter to secular nationalism and communism to bolster 
these doctrines and maintain control of the region’s oil. This partnership with Islamism, a 
militaristic and political ideology derived from Islam that is often referred to as Islamic 
fundamentalism, thus became a significant feature of American Cold War strategy (Kumar, 
2012). Essentially, the American government used Islamist groups to negate Soviet political 
power and solidify the West as the primary foreign influence in the region. After the Six Day 
War in 1967, which was a substantial humiliation for major conventional Arab leaders, Islamist 
groups capitalized on the new power vacuum in the region (Kumar, 2012). With this 
development, Islamism gained a more public stage on which it could operate, and obtained 
increased political influence within the region.  
Leading up to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the United States continued to widely support 
Islamist groups to meet its Cold War objectives. In the 1979 Iranian Revolution, however, the 
Islamic Republican Party overthrew the U.S.-backed Shah, and 52 Americans in the U.S. 
Embassy were taken hostage for 444 days (Kumar, 2012). At the time, the Iran Hostage Crisis 
was the most heavily broadcasted event relating to the Middle East, and was also the first time 
international terrorism became associated with Islam (McAlister, 2002). A major defeat to 
American hegemony in the Middle East, the U.S. government developed a new narrative of 
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fanaticism as being inherently Islamic as the dominant lens through which it understood Middle 
Eastern policy. This lens, however, neglected to acknowledge the United States’ historical role in 
the Middle East. 
Although the 1979 Iranian Revolution produced a heightened suspicion of Islamism in 
the United States, the government continued to establish relationships with Islamist groups 
where it was deemed necessary to supplement Cold War efforts. Both the Carter and Reagan 
Administrations funded and trained the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan to draw the Soviet Union 
into a lengthy war that would consume the Soviet’s attention and resources (Kumar, 2012). 
While at the time the Soviet-Afghan War seemed vital to maintaining U.S. geopolitical power, 
the growth of the Mujahedeen led to the emergence of the Taliban and eventually of al-Qaeda 
(Kumar, 2012). Consequently, the United States’ historical policies in the Middle East and 
support of Islamist groups directly fed into terrorist grievances that motivated the 9/11 attacks. 
Whether the U.S. supported Islamist groups to advance Cold War interests, or demonized them 
after 9/11, the government continually neglected to consider how its Middle Eastern policies 
would affect the United States and its relationship with the international community.  
After the end of the Cold War, President George H. W. Bush and President Clinton both 
remained committed to U.S. geopolitical power and oil interests in light of a new world order. 
Acting at the world’s policeman and dominant power, the United States continually intervened in 
Middle Eastern affairs to prevent a destabilization of U.S. global influence. Terrorists cited this 
military engagement and complicated history in the Middle East as justification for multiple 
terrorist attacks on U.S. diplomatic and military establishments around the world and 
domestically (Kumar, 2012). Most notable was the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing by al-
Qaeda-trained terrorists (Kumar, 2012). These attacks foreshadowed the danger in the 
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government’s dismissal of its involvement with Islamism and its complex role in the Middle 
East.  
Unreceptive to its own historical influence, the U.S. government perpetuated the narrative 
of American innocence in geopolitics. Coupled with the American public’s view and knowledge 
of terrorism, this dichotomy between the United States and the Middle East strengthened. Such a 
simplistic understanding of the post-Cold War world was expressed by Bernard Lewis’ “Roots of 
Muslim Rage” article in The Atlantic, which pitted Islam against the West, and claimed that 
Muslims were inherently resentful and oppositional to Western societies (Lewis, 1990). This 
stance was supported by Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” theory. Huntington 
maintained that post-Cold War, world conflict would be defined by differences between cultures 
(1997). Specifically, Islamic extremism would constitute the biggest threat to Western society 
(Huntington, 1997). Lewis and Huntington’s claims became leading narratives in the post-Cold 
War era that furthered the notion of Islam as a producer of terrorism. With the attacks on 
September 11, 2001 by al-Qaeda, both the American public and the government adopted this lens 
in their approach to counterterrorism.  
The U.S. government’s short-term memory discounts its own complicated role in the 
region, making the government perceive itself as blameless for developments in terrorism. The 
United States has repeatedly deployed its military to the Middle East to further its Cold War and 
post-Cold War interests. The government has even aided the creation of the Mujahedeen and 
funded other Islamist groups that later formed al-Qaeda and attacked the United States. Blind to 
its influence on the geopolitics leading up to 9/11, the U.S. government continues to portray 
itself as an innocent victim. Such a precedent was furthered in the government’s interpretation of 
and response to 9/11. 
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III. Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America 
 
 Leading up to 2001, Cold War motivations had a significant role in influencing U.S. 
responses to and understandings of terrorism and the Middle East. In the face of an 
unprecedented crisis on 9/11, the Bush Administration was forced to examine the country’s 
security apparatuses. As a part of this re-examination, the government understood 9/11 as 
resulting from vulnerabilities in the United States’ security strategy (Baker, 2003). This 
vulnerability was comprehended as civil liberties, because they delayed effective responses to 
threats (Baker, 2003). As such, the government produced a new counterterrorism strategy that 
brought the “liberty versus security” debate back to the forefront of policy. 
The “liberty versus security” debate refers to the notion of liberty and security as being 
mutually exclusive in states of emergency (Atkin, 2013). To enhance security measures, civil 
liberties must be at least partially suspended. This chronicle justifies the government’s restriction 
of civil liberties and expansion of security apparatuses and powers (Agamben, 2005). By playing 
upon the fear of another terrorist attack, the government rationalized its actions with minimal 
dispute; however, not all Americans accepted this suspension of civil liberties. Opponents of the 
government’s security measures claim that restricting civil liberties is never acceptable, even in 
times of emergency, because doing so compromises basic democratic values (Etzioni, 2004). 
Nonetheless, the government insists that those who contest counterterrorism measures on behalf 
of civil liberties are unpatriotic and inviting of terrorism (Atkin, 2013). The “liberty versus 
security” debate is dangerous in its insistent dichotomy, because it ceases productive discussion 
regarding U.S. counterterrorism policy and the War on Terror. Rather, it portrays liberty and 
security as inherently incompatible in times of crisis, which encourages the sacrificing of liberty 
despite the limitless trajectory of the War on Terror.  
	 8	
This thesis will evaluate the role of the “liberty versus security” debate in the Bush, 
Obama, and Trump Administrations’ leading domestic counterterrorism strategies: the USA 
PATRIOT Act, Countering Violent Extremism, and the Travel Ban. The Bush Administration’s 
USA PATRIOT Act removed longstanding judicial obstacles to privacy intrusion and 
investigations in terrorism-related cases, relying heavily upon preemptive detentions and 
surveillance (Fox, 2013). Essentially, it reduced judicial oversight to accelerate responses to 
potential threats. The Obama Administration’s Countering Violent Extremism program shifted 
the government’s counterterrorism strategy to counter-radicalization efforts by emphasizing 
community outreach and partnerships with local law enforcement. This local government-based 
initiative aimed to address the forces that influence people living in the United States to turn to 
violent extremism (Bjelopera, 2012). Finally, President Trump signed an executive order in 
January 2017 that blocked citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the 
United States (Exec. Order 13769, 2017). Each of these three counterterrorism policies 
prioritizes security and restricts the role of liberty in the War on Terror. These policies will be 
further evaluated throughout the remainder of this thesis.  
 
IV. Literature Review 
 
The Liberty vs. Security Debate 
 
 The September 11th attacks altered the government’s approach to and understanding of 
counterterrorism. Building on the heightened demand for security and threat of another terrorist 
attack, the Bush Administration adopted the USA PATRIOT Act. The government’s actions 
during the policy’s implementation, such as surveillance, preemptive detentions, and secret trials, 
introduced the idea of liberty and security as being mutually exclusive: to ensure the security of 
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the nation, citizens’ civil liberties must be restricted. With the War on Terror still ongoing, the 
debate over liberty and security holds particular salience, because it risks restricting liberties for 
an unlimited period of time. Such a development threatens citizens’ constitutional rights, 
undermining the very foundation of democracy. This literature review illustrates the current 
understanding of the role of liberty in security policy, and delves into the prominence of such a 
debate in the context of the War on Terror. Much of this scholarship examines how 
counterterrorism policies disparately sacrifice the liberties of Arab and Muslim American 
communities in the War on Terror. The relevant literature lacks an evaluation on how this 
precedent was set by the Bush Administration and sustained by the Obama and Trump 
Administrations. This thesis will investigate the dangers of United States leaders’ acceptance of 
this narrative, and how counterterrorism policies of the past two presidents have motivated the 
Trump Administration’s harsh approach to national security.  
 The delineation of liberty and security as mutually exclusive in security policy emerges 
within a state of emergency. This idea is referred to as the “state of exception,” which theorizes 
that the government, or a branch of the government, can use a state of emergency to justify 
diminishing constitutional rights as an exception to established law (Agamben, 2005). Literature 
supporting the state of exception theory argues that liberties are a vulnerability to the state and 
compromise the effectiveness of responses to potential threats (Posner & Vermeule, 2007). As 
such, this side of the debate maintains that liberty and security cannot simultaneously exist in 
times of emergency, and that the value gained from the government enhancing security measures 
outweighs any losses to liberty. A larger portion of the literature, however, critiques prioritizing 
security over liberty by highlighting the dangers in doing so. These scholars claim that the 
understanding of freedom as a weakness is both false and threatening, because expanding a 
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sovereign’s power has the potential to indefinitely suspend citizens’ civil rights and transform 
democracies into totalitarian states (Agamben, 2005; Baker, 2003; Etzioni, 2004; Walker, 2012). 
This literature is especially relevant when considering the open-ended scope of the War on 
Terror. 
When investigating the balance of liberty and security in counterterrorism policy, one 
must consider that both maintain significance in a democracy, and that neither can be dismissed 
without serious implications. This thesis contests the claim that liberties must be restricted to 
ensure security. I argue that granting the government unchecked power compromises the 
principles of democracy and threatens liberty in the long-term. This thesis will frame how the 
Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations have used the state of exception in their respective 
counterterrorism policies to justify an overreach of governmental powers.  
 
The Strategic Sacrifice of Liberties in Counterterrorism Policies 
 
Counterterrorism efforts pose a distinct challenge for democratic states: how to punish 
and prevent terrorist violence, while simultaneously upholding civil liberties (Cole & Dempsey, 
2002; Fox, 2013). The scholarship claims that curtailing civil liberties with the USA PATRIOT 
Act creates a less secure society by assuming guilt by association to the group that is being 
regulated, and has done little to eradicate terrorism (Cole & Dempsey, 2002; Fox, 2013). In the 
context of the War on Terror, Arab and Muslim Americans represent the group being regulated. 
Further scholarship analyzes the efficacy of the USA PATRIOT Act, and criticizes that the lack 
of oversight results in a disparate implementation of the policy (Cole & Dempsey, 2002; Etzioni, 
2004; Atkin, 2013). Such haphazard execution demonstrates the Bush Administration’s 
indifference to the constitutional rights of Arab and Muslim Americans. This thesis will 
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demonstrate that the USA PATRIOT Act’s implementation inspired a commonplace bias that has 
exposed itself in the Obama Administration in a new form, but has greatly amplified with the 
Trump Administration. 
Despite a rhetorical change in the Obama Administration’s counterterrorism approach, 
the implementation of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program undermined the 
Administration’s efforts to change the negative connotations associated with the War on Terror. 
Obama promoted the concept of counter-radicalization, which focused on preventing Muslims 
from adopting violent extremist ideologies. The discussion of radicalization encouraged policy 
makers to believe that terrorism could be prevented through the surveillance of the mental and 
spiritual lives of Muslims, but neither a causal relationship between Islam and violence, nor a 
distinct path towards violent extremism has factually been demonstrated (Aziz, 2014; Beydoun, 
2015; Kundnani, 2015; Patel 2011). Proponents of radicalization theory do not take political 
motivations for terrorism, such as U.S. military intervention, into account, therefore failing to 
truly address the causes of terrorism. Rather, CVE links radicalization with devoutness to Islam, 
posing a distinct threat to observant Muslim Americans and compromising their free-exercise 
rights. Community policing in the CVE program intensified existing civil liberties violations, 
making Muslim communities more suspicious of local law enforcement, and thus hindering the 
mutual relationship required of the program (Aziz, 2014; Beydoun, 2015; Kundnani, 2015; Patel 
2011).  
Increased focus on Muslim communities by both the Bush and Obama Administrations 
encouraged the “Muslim terrorist” stereotype, which therefore justified restricting the liberties of 
a community that was deemed suspicious. I will expand upon that narrative by demonstrating 
that despite a change in administrative rhetoric, the implementation of community surveillance 
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further perpetuated systemic bigotry against Arab and Muslim American communities by 
sacrificing their liberties in the name of national security. This precedent was maintained by both 
the Bush and Obama Administrations, but has expanded in the Trump Presidency with the Travel 
Ban. Building upon these ideas and narratives, the Trump Administration instituted a policy 
founded on the exclusion of a population. I will extend this discussion on the dangers of 
polarizing a population in the Trump Administration’s Travel Ban, and how barring a certain 
population from entering the United States is an ineffective counterterrorism policy.  
 
 
The Impact of Targeting Muslim and Arab Americans 
 
The implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act and CVE targeted Arab and Muslim 
Americans, portraying the community as inherently suspicious and supportive of terrorism. 
These methods explain terrorism as deriving from Islam, politicizing Arab and Muslim 
Americans’ actions as a manifestation of tradition or religion (Aziz, 2014; Jamal & Naber 2008; 
Mamdani, 2004). This discourse divides Arab and Muslim Americans into “good” law-abiding 
Muslims who cooperate with counterterrorism efforts, and “bad” Muslims who demand civil 
liberties at the cost of security (Aziz, 2014; Jamal & Naber 2008; Mamdani, 2004). Muslims who 
contest the restriction of their liberties are deemed inviting of terrorism, and the government 
suggests that restoring their liberties will impede security measures and make the country 
vulnerable to another attack. Thus, terrorism is tied less to political realities, and instead assumes 
a religious component.  
 Justified by the presentation of Arab and Muslim Americans as members of a criminal 
group whose religion is inclined towards violence, the community is stripped of full national 
belonging or cultural citizenship (Cainkar & Maira, 2005). Studies conducted in the Chicago and 
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San Francisco areas in the years following 9/11 demonstrate this exclusion by discussing how a 
vast majority of Arab and Muslim Americans felt marginalized by the public, subjected to hate 
crimes, and targeted by local police efforts (Cainkar, 2009; Naber, 2008). Discourses produced 
in the wake of 9/11 introduced Arab and Muslim American communities to harassment and 
backlash founded in both societal racism and systemic targeting, instilling a sentiment within the 
communities that they are outsiders in the nation (Cainkar, 2009; Naber, 2008).  
This scholarship criticizes the government’s selective enforcement of counterterrorism 
laws, and argues that such efforts have marginalized Arab and Muslim American communities as 
undeserving of full civil rights. By holding the Arab and Muslim American community 
responsible for the 9/11 attacks, the government’s actions have turned the War on Terror into an 
open-ended and arbitrary war against a minority. This thesis will further contribute to this 
scholarship to demonstrate how the biased discourse associated with the implementation of the 
Bush and Obama Administrations’ counterterrorism policies culminated in an openly racist 
policy by the Trump Administration. 
V. Methodology 
 
Table 1. Methodology 
Administration Bush Obama Trump 
Domestic 
Counterterrorism 
Policy 
USA PATRIOT Act Countering Violent 
Extremism 
Travel Ban 
Specific 
Components 
Evaluated 
Controversial Sections Three Priority Areas Evolution Of The Ban 
Effectiveness in 
Combatting 
Terrorism 
Contributions to 
Terrorism 
Investigations & 
Convictions 
Report on Progress in 
Three Priority Areas 
Potential Long-Term 
Consequences  
Impact on Arab 
& Muslim 
Populations 
Discourse Analysis Discourse Analysis Discourse Analysis and 
Short-Term  
Consequences  
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I examined the respective foremost domestic counterterrorism policies to evaluate the 
effectiveness of national security efforts in the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations. For 
the Bush Administration, I chose the most controversial sections of the USA PATRIOT Act in 
terms of their impact on civil liberties, and used think tank reports and personal narratives to 
analyze their effectiveness in contributing to terrorist investigations and convictions. For the 
Obama Administration, I assessed the three priority areas of the Countering Violent Extremism 
program’s Strategic Implementation Plan and the United States Government Accountability 
Office’s report on the progress of the priority areas. For the Trump Administration, I looked at 
the ban’s two primary actions, the exclusion of individuals from certain countries and the refugee 
cap, and how the Administration released three executive orders in response to legal challenges 
to the ban. I also proposed potential long-term consequences of the ban on counterterrorism 
efforts based on various think tank reports and articles. Finally, I relied on anthropological 
studies and narratives to conduct a discourse analysis that discusses how the policies favored 
particular groups’ interests and impacted Arab and Muslim Americans’ civil liberties. Due to the 
recent and pending nature of the Travel Ban, I also considered the short-term consequences of 
the ban on Arabs and Muslims entering the United States or living in the country with visas. 
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
The following chapters analyze each Administration’s respective counterterrorism 
policies, the implementations of such policies, and the effects of each policy on Arab and 
Muslim Americans’ civil liberties. Chapter 2 reviews various sections of the USA PATRIOT 
Act, illuminating concerns with the lack of oversight in its implementation, and illustrating how 
the policy disparately targeted Arab and Muslim Americans. Chapter 3 examines the CVE 
program, discusses problems that arise when utilizing counter-radicalization as a primary 
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strategy, and exposes how unregulated CVE efforts ostracized Arab and Muslim American 
communities. Chapter 4 explains the Travel Ban in the context of Trump’s “America First” 
approach to politics, highlights the timeline of judicial challenges to the executive order over the 
first year of his presidency, and proposes potential implications of the ban contingent on the 
Supreme Court’s ruling on the order in June 2018. The final chapter conceptualizes the influence 
of each policy on the next, as well as the role that liberty plays in post-9/11 America 
counterterrorism strategy. 	
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Chapter 2: The Bush Administration and the USA PATRIOT Act 
 
“On September 11, the wheel of history turned and the world will never be the same.”  – Attorney General John Ashcroft1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 In response to 9/11, the Bush Administration launched a domestic and global War on 
Terror that pitted security and liberty against one another. This dichotomy conveyed liberty as a 
vulnerability of security, indicating that liberty must be controlled to ensure the security of the 
state. What role do both liberty and security play in the Bush Administration’s counterterrorism 
policies, and what are the implications of such policies on Arab and Muslim Americans’ 
liberties? This chapter analyzes the mutual exclusivity of liberty and security in the USA 
PATRIOT Act, and exposes how the government exploited the public’s fear of another terrorist 
attack to justify restricting Arab and Muslim American’s liberties. I argue that the Bush 
Administration’s unregulated and expanded government power led to an ineffective 
counterterrorism policy that limited civil liberties and ostracized Arab and Muslim Americans. 
The first section of this chapter introduces the Bush Administration’s approach to 
counterterrorism both internationally and at home. The chapter then evaluates various 
controversial sections of the USA PATRIOT Act, and how the purposeful lack of oversight in 
these sections posed a significant threat to civil liberties and American values. In the absence of 
regulation, federal law enforcement justified arbitrarily targeting Arab and Muslim Americans by 
playing upon the narrative that the entire community is inherently guilty and responsible for the 
actions of a few individuals. 
 																																																								
1 Ashcroft, J. (2001). “September 11, 2001: Attack on America.” Prepared Remarks for the U.S. Mayors Conference of October 
25. Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice. 
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II. A New Approach to Counterterrorism 
 
The Bush Doctrine 
 
The September 11th attacks on the U.S. instilled a deep-rooted fear of terrorism in many 
Americans. In response to the attacks and the public’s call for protection, the Bush 
Administration focused on international security concerns. Just nine days after the attacks, 
President George W. Bush announced his global fight against terrorism to Congress. The Bush 
Doctrine, a new approach to foreign policy and counterterrorism, was based on the principles of 
American primacy and preemptive war (Birkenthal, 2013). Effectively, the Bush Administration 
viewed the United States as the international hegemon, which included the right to declare war 
against enemies intending to inflict harm on the United States (Birkenthal, 2013). The 
government prepared to assert its dominance in the domestic and global arenas by any means 
possible. 
The Bush Administration justified many of its counterterrorism methods by capitalizing 
on the threat of terrorism. Internationally, the Bush Doctrine undermined democracy, 
international law, and civil liberties. These methods included the creation of secret CIA prisons 
and domestic surveillance programs, the use of enhanced interrogation tactics against terrorists, 
and a directive for the military and CIA to engage in covert operations to assassinate terrorist 
group leaders using drone strikes (Birkenthal, 2013). The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 
2001 and 2003 were further emulations of the Bush Doctrine’s aggressive and preemptive global 
strategy (Birkenthal, 2013). These actions were symbols of the Administration’s dismissive 
attitude towards human rights and international law standards, which normalized the 
mistreatment of foreign nationals and the suspension of rights in the enduring War on Terror.  
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Domestically, the Bush Administration carried out its counterterrorism doctrine by 
capturing more information on terrorists. Operation TIPS was a domestic information-gathering 
program that encouraged citizens to spy on one another and to report any suspicious activity 
(Etzioni 2004). In 2004, the Intelligence Reform act furthered intelligence gathering by 
establishing a new set of intelligence organizations, such as the National Counterterrorism 
Center (Cole & Dempsey 2006). These domestic intelligence-gathering programs attempted to 
improve communication among agencies and to identify threats before an attack occurred. 
Contention over Operation TIPS eventually led to its reversal, but the USA PATRIOT Act, 
arguably the most publicly scrutinized and controversial domestic counterterrorism law of the 
Bush Administration, continues today. The USA PATRIOT Act limited civil liberties in the 
name of security, but the removal of regulation and judicial oversight of these efforts ostracized a 
minority both abroad and at home.   
 
III. An Analysis of The USA PATRIOT Act 	
An Introduction  
	
The USA PATRIOT Act, short for “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism,” removed longstanding judicial 
obstacles to privacy intrusion and vastly expanded executive authority (Fox, 2013). Passed 
hastily within mere weeks of September 11th, the USA PATRIOT Act was never subjected to an 
official debate or testimony on the floor of Congress (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). Rather, under 
immense pressure to prevent further violence, Congress passed the act based on the assumption 
that the public’s desire for additional security justified compromising democratic values and civil 
liberties (Fox, 2013). This lack of congressional discussion and removal of judicial oversight set 
	 19	
a precedent for aggressive and unchecked government authority that came to define the Bush 
Administration’s counterterrorism strategy in the years to come. 
In an attempt to secure the country, the USA PATRIOT Act employed various measures 
to supplement heightened airport security. Some of these methods included search and seizures 
without “probable cause,” eased restrictions on the types of documents law enforcement could 
obtain, interception of private communications, surveillance, deferral of due process, and 
indefinite extrajudicial detention of non-citizens (Fox 2013). Amidst the confusion of 9/11, a 
new era was born: an era that prioritized homeland security and dismissed the consequences of 
curbing civil liberties and American democratic values.  
The Bush Administration’s rhetoric prior to passing the USA PATRIOT Act 
demonstrated that although the act was often directed at foreign nationals, it was intended to 
target Arab and Muslim Americans. A statement by Attorney General John Ashcroft to the U.S. 
Mayors Conference on October 25, 2001 illustrated the Bush Administration’s assertive stance 
against terrorists. But, in doing so, he took a stance against foreign nationals. 
“Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visa – even by one 
day – we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will be put in jail and kept 
in custody as long as possible. We will use every available statute. We will seek 
every prosecutorial advantage. We will use all our weapons within the law and 
under the Constitution to protect life and enhance security for America.” 
(Ashcroft, 2001) 
 
In this statement, Ashcroft was strong in his declaration that the Administration was willing and 
able to employ an aggressive counterterrorism strategy. His reference to foreign nationals, 
however, was telling of the direction that the USA PATRIOT Act would take. By referencing 
immigration visas, Ashcroft transformed foreign nationals with visa violations into potential 
terrorists, feeding into the existing fear of foreign nationals as potential terrorists. He took the 
alienation of foreign nationals one step further: 
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“Some will ask whether a civilized nation – a nation of law and not of men – can 
use the law to defend itself from barbarians and remain civilized. Our answer, 
unequivocally, is "yes." Yes, we will defend civilization. And yes, we will 
preserve the rule of law because it makes us civilized.” (Ashcroft 2001) 
 
The rhetoric chosen in this preceding statement exuded the message of the clash of 
civilizations, equating terrorists to barbarians and democracy to civilization. The danger 
in this dichotomy lies in his language about foreign nationals. By equating visa violators 
with terrorists, Ashcroft thus drew a connection between foreign nationals and 
barbarians. John Ashcroft’s hostile and aggressive rhetoric foreshadowed the trajectory 
that the USA PATRIOT Act took in the following years: a path of systemic 
discrimination that undermined homeland security efforts and alienated a population.  
 
 
Sect. 213: “Sneak and Peek” Searches 	
 This provision of the USA PATRIOT Act authorized the use of secret searches in 
criminal investigations. Typically, searches conducted in criminal investigations are subject to a 
standard procedure known as the “knock and announce” rule, where law enforcement must 
knock on the door of the place being searched to give the owner notice (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). 
This procedure provides the owners with the ability to oversee the search, and to ensure that the 
search does not violate the measures outlined in the warrant (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). Under a 
“sneak and peek” warrant, this standard does not exist.  
Section 213, “Authority for Delaying Notice of the Execution of a Warrant,” allowed 
federal law enforcement to delay notifying recipients of search and seizure warrants when there 
was “reasonable cause to believe” that such a notification would have “an adverse result” on the 
investigation (United States, 2001). These searches have been nicknamed “sneak and peek” 
warrants, because they do not require the knowledge of the individual being investigated (Cole & 
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Dempsey, 2006). These warrants allowed federal law enforcement to “search and seize any 
property or material which constitutes evidence of a criminal offense,” and thus expanded federal 
law enforcement’s capabilities beyond those of counterterrorism (United States, 2001). The 
Justice Department has even confirmed that it used Section 213 to justify “sneak and peek” 
searches in non-violent investigations that were unrelated to terrorism (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). 
The provision is problematic, because the lack of regulation for the searches allowed federal law 
enforcement to engage in activities that breached parameters of the warrants.  
The Electronic Frontier Foundation conducted an analysis of “sneak and peek” warrants 
through Freedom of Information Act requests (Timm, 2011). From 2006 to 2009, “sneak and 
peek” warrants were used 1,755 times, but only 15 of those cases, or 0.8%, were used for 
terrorist investigations (Timm, 2011). The rest of the warrants were used for drug or fraud 
related cases (Timm, 2011). These figures demonstrate that “sneak and peek” warrants were not 
used for extraordinary situations that posed an immediate threat to the nation’s safety, but that 
they were used to curtail legal obstacles, expedite the investigation process, and further federal 
law enforcement’s agenda without limit. “Sneak and peek” warrants have become the rule, rather 
than the exception, thanks to the USA PATRIOT Act.  
This exploitation of Section 213 was further demonstrated when the FBI used 
information obtained through a “sneak and peek” warrant against Anser Mehmood, a Pakistani 
immigrant (Malek, 2011). The FBI and INS questioned Anser on October 3, 2001 about two of 
his wife’s brothers who were wanted on charges of credit card fraud. Then, after receiving a tip 
that Anser was tied to terrorist activities from a transportation company that previously worked 
with him, he was detained by the FBI for being a “high interest” suspected terrorist, and spent 
months in solitary confinement (Malek, 2011). During this time, government officials informed 
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Anser’s lawyer that the FBI had searched his home while his wife was asleep and unaware. His 
wife awoke in the middle of the search to find 25 people searching their home and throwing their 
belongings around; she said her children were shocked at the state of their house when they 
returned from school. During the search, the FBI reported that they found box cutters, a license 
to carry hazardous materials, a flight simulator program, and three Pakistani passports in Anser’s 
name. Anser claimed that the box cutters were for his job, the hazardous materials license were 
for his trucking company, the flight simulator program was a video game for his children, and 
that two of the three passports were expired. Anser’s wife and lawyer could not get in touch with 
Anser while he was detained. He was later deported back to Pakistan when given the option to 
either fight in court or be deported on account of having used an unauthorized social security 
card (Malek, 2011). Anser’s story is one of many that followed a “hold until cleared” policy, 
where foreign nationals who were arrested for visa violations were held until cleared of terrorist 
charges (Malek, 2011). The investigation of Anser further reveals how the government exploited 
“sneak and peek” warrants, and that targeting foreign nationals was an ineffective 
counterterrorism policy that resulted in few terrorist convictions, but multiple deportations. 
 
 
Sects. 215 and 505: Gag Orders 	
Section 215, “Access to Records and Other Items Under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act,” (FISA) allowed the FBI to order the “production of any tangible things 
(including books, records, papers, documents, and other items)” for a terrorist investigation 
(United States, 2001). Under FISA, Section 215 allowed easier access to records by lowering the 
standard of proof necessary to obtain a FISA order and by expanding the types of items that 
could be demanded (ACLU, 2009). Most controversially, Section 215 requests were served with 
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gag orders, making it illegal for people issued with a FISA order to disclose that the FBI was 
investigating them (Atkin, 2013). These gag orders were additionally presented with unrestricted 
time limits (Atkin, 2013).  
Section 505 used National Security Letters to maintain similar secrecy. Section 505 
“Miscellaneous National Security Authorities,” authorized third parties to release telephone toll 
and transaction records, financial records, and consumer reports upon request by the FBI (United 
States, 2001). The FBI uses National Security Letters (NSL), which includes nondisclosure 
provisions for the recipients, to request such information (Atkin, 2013). The FBI does not need 
court approval to issue an NSL; they only need to certify that the records requested were relevant 
to an investigation (Atkin, 2013).  
Sections 215 and 505 posed enormous threats to the rule of law by enforcing secrecy and 
the systemic absence of oversight. Left intentionally vague, these sections expanded the 
government’s ability to demand any and all information that third parties hold (Cole & Dempsey 
2006). For instance, rather than asking for a specific individual’s hotel records in an 
investigation, the vagueness permitted the government to ask the hotel for the records of anyone 
who had ever stayed in that same room, or for the records of anyone who stayed in the hotel on 
the same days as the individual being investigated. Essentially, such investigations are 
boundless, compromising one’s right to privacy.  
Issuing gag orders to ensure secrecy only supplemented the government’s reliance on 
abuse of power. In the past, prosecutors could obtain similar information through grand jury 
subpoenas that did not require independent judicial review (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). This 
process required empaneling a grand jury of citizens, and enabled the subpoena to be overseen 
by both the grand jury and the press, because recipients of the subpoenas were allowed to make it 
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public. The USA PATRIOT Act’s mandate of gag orders halted this process of oversight, 
because it does not require the empaneling of a grand jury, nor does it allow for the recipient to 
disclose the gag order to the public or any other individual (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). Thus, gag 
orders prevent recipients from challenging subpoenas or seeking legal advice. The jump from 
8,500 issued NSLs in 2000 to 49,425 issued in 2006 demonstrates a dramatic increase in a tool 
that has a strong potential for exploitation (ACLU, 2009). Roughly 192,000 NSLs were issued 
between 2003-2006, but only one of these led to a terrorism conviction (Timm, 2011). Further, 
the New York Times reported that Section 215 orders may be used to obtain private information 
about individuals who have no link to a terrorism case (Timm, 2011). The ability for the 
government to use a section of the USA PATRIOT Act, which is a policy committed to 
improving homeland security efforts, in non-counterterrorism related cases is a testament to the 
abuse of power that the government granted itself through its intentional lack of judicial 
regulation. 
The abusive nature of gag orders was addressed legally in 2005 and 2008. In 2005, under 
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, NSL requirements were modified so 
that recipients could obtain advice from attorneys (Atkin, 2013). In 2008, the U.S. Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that gag orders violated the First Amendment by placing an 
undue burden on a recipient’s ability to challenge the subpoenas (Atkin, 2013). The ruling also 
addressed the illegality of the absence of judicial review in obtaining gag orders, and the 
avoidance of time limits placed on the gag orders (Atkin, 2013). Such legal challenges to gag 
orders demonstrate that the USA PATRIOT Act allowed law enforcement to engage in 
unchecked, secretive activities that led to the exploitation of basic civil liberties.  
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Sects. 216 and 218: Warrantless Searches and Wiretaps 
 
Sections 216 and 218 took intelligence gathering through surveillance a step further. 
Section 216, “Modification of Authorities Relating to Use of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace 
Devices,” expanded pen register and trap and trace authorities (United States, 2001). Pen 
registers and trap and trace devices collect information about the phone numbers dialed and 
received by a tapped phone. Section 216 extended these authorities to “include the contents of 
any wire or electronic communications,” effectively permitting the monitoring of phone calls 
(United States, 2001). Section 218 was labeled broadly as “Foreign Intelligence Information” 
(United States, 2001). This section relaxed the standard for FISA searches and surveillance by 
only requiring the government to demonstrate that a “significant purpose” of the FISA search is 
to gather foreign intelligence information, rather than having it as the “primary purpose” of the 
order (ACLU, 2009).  
These sections of the USA PATRIOT Act substantially expanded the government’s 
authority to collect information. The Fourth Amendment allows searches and wiretaps of 
individuals only where probable cause that an individual is involved in criminal activity is 
demonstrated, or in the case where evidence of a crime will be found (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). 
Section 218 allowed the government to evade this aspect of the Fourth Amendment wherever the 
government claimed that the investigation had a purpose of gathering foreign intelligence. By 
lowering the standards for obtaining a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court order, the 
government more than doubled its reliance on these orders, increasing the number from 1012 
issued in 2000 to 2370 issued in 2007 (ACLU, 2009). Sections 216 and 218 effectively granted 
federal law enforcement unprecedented surveillance power.  
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Amir Sulaiman, a Muslim American from upstate New York, experienced the impact of 
such surveillance. After performing his poetry on the HBO show Def Poetry Jam in 2004, Amir 
was met by the FBI in San Francisco (Malek, 2011). Amir learned over the following days that 
the FBI agents interviewed his friends, family, and the school he taught at in Atlanta about his 
poetry and whether he was “anti-American.” The FBI also brought a grand jury subpoena to his 
school to obtain the names, addresses, and phone numbers of the students he had taught. Amir 
said that he knew that the FBI had, at a minimum, wire tapped his phone, because the FBI 
constantly knew where he was staying on his way back to Atlanta. After being put on the No-Fly 
List, Amir was fearful of his safety and took several measures to avoid further surveillance, even 
going so far as to move, quit his job, and use pay phones. Amir never learned the reasoning for 
his surveillance (Malek, 2011). Amir’s story demonstrates how the expansion of surveillance 
powers impacted the lives of many Arab and Muslim Americans by making them anxious about 
their futures and their civil liberties. It also portrays how lowering the standards for surveillance 
and obtaining information often do not enhance the safety of the American people, especially 
when the individual being investigated is only targeted for their faith or political views. As such, 
this abused government power has not produced the desired outcome of improved security, but 
rather has resulted in an ineffective counterterrorism effort and has polarized the country by 
encroaching on a population’s basic civil rights. 
 
 
Sect. 411: Ideological Exclusion 
 
 Outside of supplemented surveillance authorities, the USA PATRIOT Act also expanded 
ideological exclusion. Section 411 “Definitions Related to Terrorism” of the USA PATRIOT Act 
expanded the terrorism-related grounds for which a foreign national could be denied admission 
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into the United States or deported (United States, 2001). Under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, the government was authorized to exclude those individuals who endorse or support 
domestic or foreign groups that the U.S. has designated as a terrorist group (ACLU, 2009). The 
USA PATRIOT Act lengthened this list to include individuals who support any political, social, 
or other group that the Secretary of State declared undermines U.S. counterterrorism efforts 
(United States, 2001). Additionally, ideological exclusion applies to any subject that has the 
ability to “persuade others to support terrorist activity or a terrorist organization,” in a way that 
the Secretary of State deems harmful to U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The USA PATRIOT Act 
extended this definition to include spouses and children of those who are considered 
inadmissible (United States, 2001).  
 The danger with Section 411 arises when considering its potential attack on the First 
Amendment. Historically, foreign nationals living outside of the United States had no 
constitutional right to enter the country; and the Supreme Court has long supported this standard 
(Cole & Dempsey, 2006). Conversely, Section 411 threatened to deny a foreign national’s entry 
based on political views and speech, rather than on the subject’s actions (ACLU, 2009). The First 
Amendment protects discussions of all ideologies and views, but Section 411 reduced freedom of 
speech. Thus, by barring individuals who held views that the government disagreed with, 
freedom of speech as the pinnacle of American democracy was put at risk.  
 Excluding or deporting a person based on speech is a dangerous precedent that could lead 
to the suppression of political opposition. In 2005, Raed Jarrar came to the United States to 
escape a deteriorating Iraq (Malek, 2011). One year later, he was denied from boarding a JetBlue 
flight at JFK International Airport for wearing a shirt that said, “We will not be silent” in English 
and Arabic, in reference to the Iraq War. TSA staff told him that passengers found the shirt to be 
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offensive (Malek, 2011). Although Raed was not deported, this story reveals the danger in 
silencing a minority or an unpopular belief. The government’s implementation of the ideological 
exclusion statute was a manipulation of power that targeted foreign nationals and was an attack 
on one of America’s most fundamental rights: freedom of speech and belief.  
 
 
Sect. 412: Indefinite Detentions 
 
 The mistreatment of foreign nationals was further institutionalized with the introduction 
of indefinite detentions. Section 412 “Mandatory Detention of Suspected Terrorists; Habeas 
Corpus; Judicial Review,” allowed the Attorney General to detain any foreign national he 
declared a suspected terrorist, without having to initially charge the subject (United States, 
2001). The Attorney General must then verify that he had “reasonable grounds” to believe that 
the subject was engaged in terrorist activity or threatened national security. He then has seven 
days to begin criminal proceedings, removal, or release of the foreign national. If the detainee is 
held, the case must be reexamined every six months. No court has the “jurisdiction to review, by 
habeas corpus petition or otherwise, any such action or decision,” (United States, 2001). 
 While it seems reasonable to detain terrorists, the preemptive and indefinite nature of 
these detentions risks detaining those who pose no threat to national security. The USA 
PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of “terrorist activity” to include a wide range of 
immigration violations or criminal offenses (ACLU, 2009). Proponents of the section argue that 
noncitizens are not entitled to the same rights, such as due process, as American citizens (Atkin, 
2013). This argument, however, challenges basic human rights principles, because international 
law declares that all persons must be informed of any charges against them upon arrest (HRW, 
2002). Therefore, the right to due process, which is protected in the 5th and 14th Amendments of 
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the Constitution, is considered a basic human right rather than a privilege only afforded to 
American citizens (HRW, 2002). Additionally, by relying on preemptive detentions, the 
government cannot develop the necessary intelligence and evidence required of a formal 
investigation (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). Thus, preemptive and indefinite detentions pose 
significant implications to civil liberties and also undermine terrorism-related investigations. 
The right for the government to indefinitely hold foreign nationals for an immigration 
violation, which is typically a civil and not criminal offense, goes beyond the need for security. 
In the first two years following 9/11, the government detained over 5,000 foreign nationals, but 
none of those detained were convicted for terrorist activities (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). Many of 
these detainees were held without being charged and were barred from contacting the outside 
world, often preventing defendants from receiving legal advice (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). 
Preventing proper legal representation carries major consequences, especially when considering 
that many of the individuals detained were wrongly accused of their crimes with no means of 
challenging their detentions. This restriction on contact with the outside world also prevented the 
government’s disregard for civil liberties from being exposed to the public. Additionally, the 
trials were frequently conducted in private proceedings (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). Rather than 
focus its efforts on true threats to national security, the government justified its use of Section 
412 and preemptive, indefinite detentions by exploiting the narrative that foreign nationals are 
more inclined towards terrorism and violence.  
The case of Farid Rodriguez, an Arab and Muslim from Colombia who was previously 
convicted of possession of narcotics, demonstrates how the government aimed its efforts at 
foreign nationals by using their immigration status as justification for detention. Farid moved to 
the United States in 1975, and in May of 2004, was arrested for an unresolved immigration issue 
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and placed in Passaic County Jail, New Jersey (Malek, 2011). He spoke of his time in jail, and 
how the atmosphere towards Arabs and immigrants was hostile and violent, stating that they 
were “treated like animals,” and that the negative comments of elected officials “made the public 
forget that [foreign nationals] belonged here and that [they] were human,” (Malek, 2011). Farid 
also mentioned that prison officials moved detainees to other detention centers weekly, but that 
there was secrecy about where the detainees were being sent. Often, detainees would not be 
informed of their relocation until it was under way, and did not have the opportunity to notify 
their families. He believed that the government was acting in such secrecy to prevent their 
families and lawyers from reopening their deportation case, as visa violations were frequently 
used to justify detentions. Farid was released in August of 2004, and a judge reinstated his full 
and permanent residency one year later with the help of the Legal Aid Society (Malek, 2011). 
Farid’s case reveals that the government justified Section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act by 
playing upon the fears of foreign nationals as inherently criminal. His case also testifies to how 
the Bush Administration’s exploitation of immigration status was a groundless and ineffective 
counterterrorism method. 
 
 
Sect. 805: Material Support 	
 Section 805 “Material Support for Terrorism,” banned material support to individuals and 
organizations that commit various crimes of terrorism, and expanded such crimes to include 
providing “expert advice” (United States, 2001). Again, it would appear reasonable for the 
government to ban the support of terrorist activity; however, the implementation method for 
material support was overly broad. Under Section 805, material support encompassed any form 
of support, from aid distribution to supplying weapons (Cole, 2008). The USA PATRIOT Act 
	 31	
defined a terrorist organization as “any group of two or more persons that has used or threatened 
to use violence,” greatly expanding the scope of the definition to include almost any organization 
that has ever been involved in a civil war or in criminal violence (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). 
Essentially, the expansion of material support criminalized political association, and threatened 
to persecute individuals who have no previous or planned participation in violence (ACLU, 
2009). Material support took the “guilty until proven innocent” precedent one step further by 
enforcing guilt by association to any group designated as “terrorist” by the government. 
 The Supreme Court challenged guilt by association during the Cold War, which indicated 
that the inclusion of guilt by association in the USA PATRIOT Act was an overstepping of 
government authority. In Scales v. United States (1961), the Supreme Court declared that the 
government must provide proof of the defendant’s intent to advance the Communist Party’s 
illegal actions (Cole, 2008). The Supreme Court held that an overly broad definition of material 
support violated the First Amendment’s right of association, and the Fifth Amendment’s 
requirement of “personal” guilt (Cole, 2008). With this ruling, the Supreme Court ruled that 
mere association with a group did not provide enough grounds for arrest, protecting individuals 
from guilt by association. When applying this standard to the War on Terror, a defendant’s intent 
to participate in or advance a terrorist organization’s violent or illegal activities must be proven, 
or it risks undermining the Constitution.  
 In 2005, the danger of guilt by association became apparent. The REAL ID Act of 2005 
made the endorsement of any terrorist activity or membership in any organization, at any time, a 
deportable offense (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). A few months later, Khader Hamide and Michel 
Shehadeh were deported for their alleged association with a Palestine Liberation Organization 
faction in the 1980s. Their political association involved distributing magazines and raising 
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funds to provide aid for Palestinians in their struggle for liberation. These actions were protected 
under the First Amendment (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). Federal law enforcement targeted Hamide 
and Shehadeh over twenty years later for supporting a political group that was legal and accepted 
at the time. The stories of Hamide and Shehadeh exhibit the arbitrary and subjective nature of the 
material support statute in War on Terror. This discriminatory behavior calls the government’s 
true intentions into question. Rather than focusing on individuals who pose a threat to the 
country’s security, the government targeted innocent foreign nationals from Arab and Muslim 
American countries.  
 
 
An Unsustainable Long-Term Counterterrorism Strategy 	
 The sections of the USA PATRIOT Act outlined above relied heavily upon preventative 
strategies. The Bush Administration used the urgency with which the USA PATRIOT Act was 
passed to intentionally neglect oversight and regulation. As such, the USA PATRIOT Act greatly 
expanded government power, allowing the Administration to conduct these activities without 
being held accountable. To justify this unregulated and expanded power, the Bush 
Administration capitalized on the public’s fears and sense of urgency following 9/11. 
Amidst the confusion following 9/11, the FBI was pressured to move more quickly in 
disrupting terrorist attacks, relying on preemptive detentions or deportations rather than 
gathering substantial evidence and building a defensible case against a suspect (Jackson, 2011). 
This urgency resulted in the inability of federal law enforcement to successfully prosecute 
alleged terrorists, which undermined counterterrorism efforts by diverting attention and 
resources to subjects that were unthreatening to the nation’s security (Jackson, 2011). 
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Under the USA PATRIOT Act, attention was on foreign nationals from Arab and 
Muslim-majority countries. Specifically, in 2002 men between the ages of 16-45 from designated 
Arab and Muslim countries, without legal permanent residence or refugee status, were required 
to register with local authorities (Jackson, 2011). Within one year, approximately 85,000 men 
registered. Deportation proceedings were initiated against over 13,000 of these men, and 2,870 
were detained for various violations. Of the 85,000 men registered, only 11 were ever suspected 
of having ties to terrorist organizations, but none were ever charged with terrorist-related crimes. 
The registration program was eventually suspended in 2011 due to discrimination allegations 
(Jackson, 2011). 
These figures demonstrate the systemic bigotry generated by the USA PATRIOT Act and 
by other government initiatives, which were justified by exploiting the narrative of the guilty 
Arab and Muslim. Government actions furthered this biased narrative, which infiltrated other 
aspects of American society. In the years following 9/11, there was a significant increase in 
airport profiling, hate crimes, and vandalism against Arab and Muslim businesses and mosques 
(Grimes, 2004).  
 
IV. Impact on Arab and Muslim American Communities 	
The USA PATRIOT Act’s focus on Arab and Muslim Americans created a dangerous 
narrative of Arabs and Muslims as inherently criminal. Although the Bush Administration 
declared that the War on Terror was not a war on Islam, the USA PATRIOT Act suggested 
otherwise. Since 9/11, the government capitalized on existing fears of terrorism, and the 
disparate nature of its implementation furthered the narrative of an arbitrary “potential terrorist” 
subject that is connected to Islamic fundamentalism (Naber, 2007).  This “potential terrorist” 
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subject emerged from the interplay of federal law enforcement’s targeting of Arab and Muslim 
foreign nationals and the open-ended scope of the domestic War on Terror.  
The government manipulated an existing suspicion of Arab and Muslim American 
communities from the 20th century, which allowed the government to infringe upon 
liberties of a minority without much contention. A study conducted in the San Francisco 
Bay Area in the two years following 9/11 found that the public began to associate the 
War on Terror with certain identifiers of Arab and Muslim Americans (Naber, 2007). The 
most prevalent identifiers included skin colors associated with Middle Eastern descent, 
Arab-style clothing, Arab-sounding names, and nation of origin. The public categorized 
anyone who was perceived to identify with these markers as being a potential terrorist 
(Naber, 2007). In the War on Terror, these identifiers furthered the narrative of Arabs and 
Muslims as the terrorist enemy, subjecting these communities to post-9/11 backlash. 
This process occurred when the government implemented the USA PATRIOT 
Act in a manner that targeted the Arab and Muslim American community. The American 
public assumed that the community deserved to be targeted, reasoning that if the 
government was focusing on them, then the community must be inherently threatening to 
national security (Jamal, 2008). The government used this logic to justify the USA 
PATRIOT Act’s restriction of the liberties of foreign nationals and those suspected of 
being enemy combatants, and in turn stereotyped a minority as a threat to national 
security.  
 This stereotyping reflected a climate of hate and discrimination after 9/11. In a 
study conducted in Chicago in the three years following 9/11, Louise A. Cainkar found 
that a vast majority of Arab and Muslim Americans felt insecure or unsafe in the United 
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States (Cainkar, 2009). The government’s implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act and 
language about the War on Terror made many Arab and Muslims Americans feel as if 
their access to liberty was unduly threatened in comparison to other populations. Often, 
this insecure access to civil rights became public with hate crimes (Cainkar, 2009). 
Whether in public or in the privacy of their homes, many Arab and Muslim Americans 
after 9/11 repeatedly felt as though detention, surveillance, and hate crimes were true 
threats to their ability to live freely (Cainkar, 2009). Such a climate of animosity is 
dangerous for a minority, but it is even more threatening to the future of a nation’s 
integrity.  
Countless narratives have been documented by individuals who were perceived to 
be a part of this “potential terrorist” group, and who expressed that they felt as if they 
were under intense scrutiny by both the government and the American public. The most 
striking of stories arises with Rana and Balbir Sohdi, brothers who left India in the 1980s 
to escape persecution for being of the Sikh faith (Malek, 2011). On September 15, 2001, 
Balbir was singled out, shot, and killed for wearing a turban at the gas station he owned. 
He was mistaken for being Muslim on account of his turban. Balbir’s death was the first 
recorded hate murder following 9/11 (Malek, 2011). This narrative portrays the danger of 
stereotyping post-9/11, demonstrating how the public assumed any individual who was 
observed as a part of the Arab and Muslim American community to be a potential 
terrorist. 
 
V. Conclusion 	
 In the chaotic aftermath of 9/11, the Bush Administration hastily passed the USA 
PATRIOT Act to protect the nation from another terrorist attack. Many of its provisions 
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were logical in the War on Terror, such as anti-money laundering authorities to dissipate 
terrorist funding. The lack of regulation and oversight explicitly removed by the act, 
however, opened a door for the government to expand its power without accountability. 
Without proper oversight or regulations to control these counterterrorism efforts, federal 
law enforcement abused its authority by projecting the actions of a few individuals onto 
the entire Arab and Muslim American community. Methods such as ideological 
exclusion, surveillance, and indefinite detentions made the government’s domestic War 
on Terror a public attempt to ostracize foreign nationals.  
Public displays of political scapegoating, coupled with the harsh and isolating 
discourse of the Bush Administration, furthered an existing fear that Arabs and Muslims 
were inherently suspicious, supportive of terrorism, and threatening to the nation’s 
security. The issue with the USA PATRIOT Act is that its expanded government 
authority has not produced its desired outcome of increased safety. Rather, it misplaced 
its focus on foreign nationals, which undermined counterterrorism efforts. 
The Bush Administration’s approach to counterterrorism took a new form in the 
Obama Administration, one that relied on community policing to prevent radicalization. 
Nonetheless, this inefficiency transmitted through the Bush to the Obama Administration. 
Almost two decades later, the government’s approach to security policy has surely 
transformed, but its inability to bring an end to the War on Terror and its unjustified 
pursuance of a population, has not.  
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Chapter 3: The Obama Administration and Countering Violent Extremism 
 
“Now, just as those of us outside Muslim communities need to reject the terrorist narrative that 
the West and Islam are in conflict, or modern life and Islam are in conflict, I also believe that 
Muslim communities have a responsibility as well.” – President Barack Obama2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 After eight years of an aggressive counterterrorism strategy based upon detentions and 
surveillance under the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration adopted a new technique 
for its domestic security approach. This mechanism was counter-radicalization, a concept 
founded on the principles of addressing the causes of terrorism before violent acts occurred. This 
chapter evaluates the efficacy of this program, known as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), 
in establishing security, and exposes the implications that it had on civil liberties. I argue that 
CVE’s flawed foundations and lack of strategic implementation undermined the Obama 
Administration’s counterterrorism efforts, encroached on civil liberties, and alienated Arab and 
Muslim Americans. 
 The first section of this chapter presents the Obama Administration’s renewed approach 
to counterterrorism. It then analyzes the counter-radicalization program’s three objectives, and 
how its lack of a cohesive and coordinated implementation strategy prevented success. 
Additionally, this chapter exposes the flawed foundation of the CVE program, and its threat to 
Arab and Muslim American’s civil liberties. I demonstrate how the Obama Administration 
utilized faulty radicalization narratives to justify the policing of Arab and Muslim American 
communities, furthering the precedent that began in the Bush Administration, which perpetuates 
the idea that Muslims are prone to terrorism.  																																																								
2 Obama, B. (2015). Remarks by the President in Closing of the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism [Transcript].  
Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/remarks-president-closing-summit-
countering-violent-extremism. 
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II. A Shift in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy 
 
The Obama Doctrine 	
When President Barack Obama took office in 2008, he established a foreign policy 
doctrine that transitioned away from the Bush Administration’s strategy. The Obama 
Administration conducted its affairs with the vision of a multi-partner world (Birkenthal, 2013). 
Rather than operate as the world’s hegemon, the Obama Doctrine focused on working alongside 
American allies and within the parameters of multilateral institutions to achieve international 
legitimacy. In coherence with this world view, the Obama Doctrine relied on “leading from 
behind” when conducting its international affairs; this refers to the attempt to avoid international 
entanglements unless unquestionably necessary (Birkenthal, 2013). Essentially, Obama aimed to 
take a backseat in global leadership by concentrating on diplomatic approaches. This approach 
extended to the Obama Administration’s counterterrorism strategy, as it attempted to shift away 
from the unilateral nature of Bush’s War on Terror (Birkenthal, 2013).  
Although Obama attempted to redefine counterterrorism, he faced some obstruction to his 
foreign policy efforts by Congress. For example, Obama attempted to close the Guantanamo Bay 
prison (Birkenthal, 2013). While this attempt was blocked by a republican vote, its emphasis on 
the end of human rights abuses in the War on Terror signaled the Obama Doctrine’s commitment 
to global cooperation and respect for rule of law. Despite this new pledge to international 
standards and change, the Obama Administration’s bolstered military involvement in the Middle 
East confused the Obama Doctrine’s objectives. In 2009, Obama announced a surge in troops in 
Afghanistan, but when democrats opposed this surge, he included a concessional deadline to 
begin troop withdrawal (Birkenthal, 2013). Obama supplemented this surge in troops with the 
increased use of drone strikes in the Middle East for targeted killings of terrorist group leaders 
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(McCrisken, 2011). Both of these actions were meant to bolster global War on Terror efforts and 
influence. Hence, Obama’s respect for international law, but renewed commitment to military 
involvement in War on Terror efforts in the Middle East, presented conflicting approaches of the 
Administration.  
Despite this contradictory foreign policy strategy, the Obama Doctrine took a different 
approach to domestic security efforts than experienced under the Bush Doctrine. CVE was based 
on addressing the root causes of violent extremism through community engagement to both 
prevent and undermine the attractiveness of terrorism (The White House, 2015). This new focus 
on precautionary counter-radicalization and community partnership efforts was a distinct 
transition away from the Bush Administration’s punishment-based approach. Although CVE was 
an attempt to change the nature of the War on Terror, local law enforcement fell into patterns of 
surveillance and marginalization of Arab and Muslim Americans, as was experienced under the 
Bush Administration. The Obama Administration’s CVE program addressed both international 
and domestic counter-radicalization; however, this thesis will focus on the Administration’s 
domestic CVE efforts.  
 
III. An Analysis of the Countering Violent Extremism Program 
 
Motivation for the CVE Program 	
With a new approach to the War on Terror, the Obama Administration shifted its 
domestic counterterrorism strategy away from surveillance and towards counter-radicalization. 
Radicalization is defined as the process of acquiring and holding radical or extremist beliefs, and 
terrorism is defined as the violent actions taken on the behalf of such beliefs (Bjelopera, 2012). 
Thus, counter-radicalization strategies address the forces that influence people living in the 
United States to acquire and hold certain beliefs that could lead to terrorism (Bjelopera, 2012).  
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Under the Obama Administration, violent extremists, defined as individuals who support 
or commit violence to further political goals, became a top priority in the U.S. domestic 
counterterrorism strategy (Department of Homeland Security, 2011a). The Administration 
directed its counterterrorism efforts at violent extremists, because they foster ideologies that are 
rooted in divisiveness and justify violence against innocent people (DHS, 2011a). The U.S. 
government acknowledged freedom of expression and belief; however, the Obama 
Administration declared that when these beliefs are furthered through the use of unjustified 
violence, it is the government’s responsibility to protect its people (DHS, 2011a). In August 
2011, the Obama Administration announced its “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States” program, known as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), to 
support this new priority in domestic counterterrorism strategy (DHS, 2011a).  
While the Bush Administration neglected the foundations that lead to terrorism and 
instead used punishment as its primary tactic, CVE attempted to address the root causes of 
violent extremism before it occurred. As such, the Obama Administration took an approach to 
domestic security that was dependent on engagement, collaboration, and partnership. The Obama 
Administration’s focus on radicalization as a root cause, however, still overlooked that 
radicalization was connected to American foreign policy and continued military intervention in 
the Middle East. Although CVE focused on prevention instead of reaction, the conflicting 
messages of CVE and the global War on Terror harbored an atmosphere of mistrust and 
suspicion similar to that created by the USA PATRIOT Act. Despite the Obama 
Administration’s determination to be different, its confused initiatives caused the CVE program 
to fall into a similar pattern of surveillance and heightened wariness of a minority.  
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Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
  
 “Empowering Local Partners” opened with a letter signed by President Barack Obama, 
who addressed the threat of al-Qaeda’s ideologies and recruiting of individuals who live in the 
United States (DHS, 2011a). CVE claimed that the most effective counterterrorism strategy is to 
combat radicalization. To build resilience against violent extremism, CVE required federal 
government support and empowerment of local community partners. “Empowering Local 
Partners” maintained that since the path to radicalization varies greatly, local partners and 
communities are more capable than the federal government of identifying risks and customizing 
the most effective responses to such threats in their specific communities. By giving local 
partners the necessary tools, CVE expected communities to be able to prevent violent extremists 
from inspiring, radicalizing, or recruiting individuals to commit terrorism in the United States 
(DHS, 2011a). Effectively, this document gave communities the lead in CVE efforts, but 
committed the federal government to cultivating this community-based approach.  
 The Obama Administration’s CVE program outlined three areas of priority action that 
should guide local efforts. The first priority area referred to “enhancing federal engagement with 
and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists,” (DHS, 2011a). As 
a part of this action, it was the federal government’s responsibility to research methods of 
implementing CVE and identifying violence threats, to share this information with local partners 
and community leaders, and to provide a space to discuss community grievances and concerns so 
that the federal government can better supplement local efforts. Much of this work related to 
sectors not traditionally a part of national security, such as promoting education and civil rights, 
to enhance local communities’ overall strength (DHS, 2011a). 
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 The second priority area was committed to “building government and law enforcement 
expertise” (DHS, 2011a). This section involved researching other countries’ CVE programs, 
identifying what factors make an individual at risk for radicalization, and preparing for potential 
developments in violent extremism (DHS, 2011a). This priority area accounted for both training 
local partners to implement CVE programs, as well as preventing local partners from engaging in 
activities that instigate tensions with their communities.  
 The final priority area was “countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our 
ideals,” (DHS, 2011a). This two-pronged section was vital in disrupting the circulation of 
narratives that justify the use of violence: the overarching goal of the CVE program (DHS, 
2011a). This section claimed that there is no single profile of a radicalized violent extremist. 
Despite this assertion, research suggested that almost all al-Qaeda-inspired violent extremists 
believe that that United States is determined to destroy Islam, and that this belief legitimizes their 
use of violence against Americans (DHS, 2011a). CVE efforts aimed to counter that narrative. 
The Administration recognized that difficulties arise with this objective, as there is a potential for 
actions taken within this parameter to inflict suspicion onto an entire community and to divide 
populations (DHS, 2011a). Thus, “Empowering Local Partners” stated that local law 
enforcement must be careful to not disparately target Muslims, or CVE risks either being 
undermined or feeding into violent extremist propaganda (DHS, 2011a).  
 This program concluded with eight principles to guide local CVE programs so that the 
strategies were both effective and upheld the rule of law. These principles were based upon basic 
democratic values. Principles included defending civil rights within counterterrorism efforts, 
building mutual-trust between communities and law enforcement, respecting religion so that 
strong beliefs were not confused with violent extremism, and not holding an entire community 
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responsible for the actions of a few terrorists (DHS, 2011a). This section of “Empowering Local 
Partners” was a deliberate shift in counterterrorism rhetoric by the Obama Administration, 
because it attempted to reintroduce civil liberties into the discussion on security. Although the 
Obama Administration tried to approach Arab and Muslim Americans as partners in the War on 
Terror to confront the suspicion cast on the community under the USA PATRIOT Act, its 
reliance on radicalization theory in Muslim American communities still furthered the perception 
of Islam as a source of violence.  
 
 
Strategic Implementation Plan 	
 In December of 2011, the Obama Administration followed up with the “Strategic 
Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 
States,” also referred to as the SIP (DHS, 2011b). DHS designed the SIP to be an outline for 
local partners when planning and executing their local CVE initiatives. 
The SIP defined four activities that must be included in CVE programs to accomplish its 
three objectives. The first activity was whole-of-government coordination, which referred to 
utilizing a multitude of tools, agencies, and partners to organize program efforts (DHS, 2011b). 
This policy included community partners such as immigration or violence prevention services 
(DHS, 2011b). As such, counterterrorism measures were to be managed by services outside of 
the typical security apparatuses, which signaled a commitment to community-led efforts.  
Second, the SIP defined the necessity for “leveraging existing public safety, violence 
prevention, and resilience programming” (DHS, 2011b). In this section, the SIP committed the 
government to using existing safety and security apparatuses to supplement the new CVE 
programs. 
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Third, the SIP focused on the coordination of domestic and international efforts (DHS, 
2011b). Although “Empowering Local Partners” and the SIP were designed specifically for 
domestic CVE efforts, the Obama Administration recognized that its counterterrorism program 
operated in a globalized world. Terrorists overseas had access to the Internet, and could therefore 
radicalize Americans (DHS, 2011b). Additionally, events both internationally and in the United 
States had the capacity to influence violent extremist propaganda (DHS, 2011b). Specifically, the 
Administration’s use of drone strikes and military presence in Afghanistan supplemented 
terrorist propaganda by feeding into political grievances. As such, the SIP acknowledged that 
domestic and international CVE efforts must be coordinated to account for all potential 
influences. This connection to the global community directly accounts for the necessity of the 
SIP’s final activity, technology and virtual space in CVE (DHS, 2011b). The SIP addressed the 
need to combat online recruitment. These four methods worked together to support the success 
of the Empowering Local Partners’ three objectives.  
 
 
Efficacy of the CVE Program 	
 In April 2017, the United States Government Accountability Office (USGAO) conducted 
a report on the CVE program after Congress asked them to review its domestic efforts (United 
States Government Accountability Office, 2017). The report evaluated the extent to which DHS, 
DOJ, and other partners implemented the 2011 SIP, the degree to which the federal government 
developed a strategy for implementing SIP activities, and how effectively the CVE Task Force 
had assessed the program’s progress. The USGAO found that there were no measurable 
outcomes of the 2011 SIP, because after five years the federal government still had not 
developed a cohesive strategy for implementation (DHS, 2011b). 
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 The USGAO found that of the 44 domestic tasks outlined in the 2011 SIP, 19 were 
implemented fully, 23 were in progress, and no action had been taken on 2 (USGAO, 2017). A 
further evaluation of the status of these tasks is later detailed. DHS and DOJ officials maintained 
that the Assessment Working Group, which is responsible for measuring the progress and 
effectiveness of CVE, had not been formed (USGAO, 2017). As of the end of 2016, there had 
been no official evaluation of the efficacy of the federal government’s CVE. Therefore, the 
USGAO could not establish whether the United States was safer than it was in 2011 as a result of 
CVE efforts. Neither the 2011 SIP, nor the updated 2016 version, established a definitive 
strategy for CVE partner coordination or for measuring the effectiveness of these methods 
(USGAO, 2017). The federal government never established a plan to efficiently distribute 
information on local CVE program guidelines, so the lack of accountability and oversight 
produced disorganized implementation across the country that tainted CVE objectives and 
undermined partnerships and trust. This disorganization resulted in methods and narratives that 
both perpetuated the “Muslim terrorist” stereotype and legitimized the reduction of Arab and 
Muslim Americans’ civil liberties. An evaluation of the SIP’s three objectives follows. 
 
Objective 1: Federal Engagement and Community Outreach 	
The first goal of enhancing federal engagement and outreach involved two sub-
objectives: improve the strength and scope of federal government engagement, as well as foster 
community partnerships and preventative programs (DHS, 2011b). A National Task Force on 
CVE was established in 2010, led by the DOJ and DHS, to coordinate community engagement at 
the national level. In December of 2010, the National Counterterrorism Center and 32 U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices further expanded their outreach to hear concerns, raise awareness about 
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violent extremism, and seek input for improvements (DHS, 2011b). The SIP declared that these 
programs would be used to aid future efforts. Future efforts included establishing an FBI-led 
CVE Coordination Office to work alongside the National Task Force on CVE, creating an online 
portal to share information and build community cooperation among government officials and 
law enforcement, and establishing a Faith-Based Community Information-Sharing Working 
Group to help DHS better distribute information to faith-based communities (DHS, 2011b). The 
SIP’s first objective, federal engagement and community outreach, portrayed Arab and Muslim 
American communities as allies in the domestic War on Terror, expressing the Obama 
Administration’s commitment to collaboration rather than punishment. CVE partnerships 
ultimately failed, however, because the SIP’s disregard for enforced regulation triggered 
misplaced efforts. These misdirected efforts caused the government to resort to surveillance of 
the community, which exploited Arab and Muslim Americans’ civil liberties. 
As of December 2016, the USGAO found that of the 17 federal engagement and 
community outreach tasks outlined for this SIP objective, 8 tasks were implemented and 9 
remain in progress (USGAO, 2017). CVE has made progress in identifying ways to increase 
community CVE activities through a series of outreach meetings, but DHS maintains that the 
main priority going forward is focusing on online outreach (USGAO, 2017).  
Aside from the lagging implementation process, there are considerable concerns that arise 
with community outreach programs. A study sponsored by the National Institute of Justice on 
community policing of Arab and Muslim Americans after 9/11 denoted four key obstacles to 
good relations between law enforcement and the community. The four obstacles include distrust 
between the community and law enforcement, language barriers, law enforcement officers’ lack 
of cultural awareness, and fears about immigration status (Henderson et al., 2008). If the 
	 47	
foundation of the relationship between law enforcement and Arab and Muslim American 
communities is shaky, communities become more wary of reaching out to law enforcement when 
an issue arises. Thus, CVE efforts risk being counterproductive. Further concerns arise when 
community outreach is used as a mask for intelligence gathering, which risks undermining 
relations between the community and law enforcement. 
Such concerns came to fruition when the FBI manipulated The Twin Cities’ Somali 
community outreach efforts. Community outreach efforts began in 2004 and were widely 
respected and successful (Price, 2015). After a surge of Somali-Americans joined the terrorist 
organization al-Shabab between 2007 and 2009, the FBI expanded the existing outreach to 
prevent further radicalization (Price, 2015). A Freedom of Information Act memo, obtained by 
the Brennan Center for Justice, exposed that in 2009 the FBI directed its Minneapolis agents, as 
well as agents in five other U.S. cities, to use community outreach with Somali communities as a 
cover for intelligence gathering on radicalization and terrorist recruitment methods (McEnroe, 
2015). The 2009 directive, known as the “African Immigrant Muslim Coordinated Outreach 
Program,” included a specific intelligence gathering function that intended to exploit the trust 
built with Muslim and Somali communities (Price, 2015). The Minneapolis FBI field office 
refused to follow the spying directive by claiming that it would have severely hindered the trust 
they had already built (McEnroe, 2015). In 2010, the Obama Administration ordered the FBI to 
stop the spying operations, and established a new initiative based on improving public trust in the 
FBI to secure community cooperation in counterterrorism efforts (Price, 2015). 
Although the Obama Administration took definitive actions to end spying within 
preexisting partnership programs, the event caused Arab and Muslim Americans’ fear of 
community outreach to persist. After the announcement of the SIP, the Twin Cities were chosen 
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as one of the federal government’s three pilot cities for the CVE program (Patel, 2015). In 2015, 
the Minnesota chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), alongside other 
civil rights organizations, voiced its concerns over this pilot program (CAIR, 2015). Specifically, 
CAIR cited the FISA documents obtained by the Brennan Center for Justice to demonstrate that 
community outreach was previously used as a mask for surveillance. Concerns were also raised 
about Andrew Luger, who would lead the CVE pilot program, because he had not yet addressed 
the civil rights abuses that occurred under his watch as the U.S. Attorney for the District of 
Minnesota. These abuses included the surveillance of Muslim communities, FBI informants in 
mosques, and the profiling of Muslims at the airport (CAIR, 2015). The 2009 incident, although 
prior to the implementation of CVE, subsequently tainted CVE objectives by exposing that 
previous outreach efforts regressed to the surveillance of Arab and Muslim Americans. 
As such, fears arose that the CVE pilot program would again act as a guise for 
intelligence gathering, ultimately serving to further ostracize the Muslim community by 
undermining their trust and partnership. At the inception of the CVE pilot program in 2015, Arab 
and Muslim American communities were already wary of the program due to the government’s 
previous exploitation of community outreach in Minnesota. Alongside civil rights groups, the 
community expressed fears of marginalization, spying, and restriction of their civil rights. 
Although the Obama Administration portrayed the narrative of Arab and Muslim Americans as 
partners in CVE, previous actions taken by the FBI generated mistrust and contradicted that 
message.  
 
Objective 2: Building Government and Law Enforcement Expertise 	
	 49	
The second CVE objective involved building expertise through research, information 
sharing, and training (DHS, 2011b). In 2011, existing activities involved DHS Science and 
Technology-sponsored research on violent extremism, discussing case studies of existing 
suspected terrorists with local partners, and the training of law enforcement officials on CVE and 
cultural awareness. Future activities involved expanding the scope of analysis and research to 
incorporate information such as single-actor terrorism, the improvement of information sharing 
with local law enforcement, and refining the breadth and quality of training (DHS, 2011b). These 
research efforts were intended to prevent radicalized individuals from committing acts of 
terrorism by providing local partners with tools to identify vulnerable populations.  
The USGAO determined that of the 19 future activities listed under the SIP’s second 
objective, 9 had been implemented, 9 were in progress, and no progress had been made on 1 
(USGAO, 2017). The SIP declared that the most essential task to make progress on was 
improving the quality of law enforcement training to avoid arbitrarily misplacing CVE efforts 
(DHS, 2011b). As of 2016, there was a lack of guidance and standards in CVE training, which 
left many offices susceptible to inadequate training that violated the core principles of 
“Empowering Local Partners” (DHS, 2011b). The local law enforcement officials currently 
being trained on identifying risk factors are the personnel responsible for executing CVE 
operations. A lack of quality training for these officials risks operations deviating from the 
democratic and culturally aware guiding principles of CVE. Misinformed law enforcement 
officials threaten the success of CVE efforts, and also risk ostracizing the Arab and Muslim 
American community by directing efforts onto the community on false grounds.  
CVE is fundamentally flawed in its reliance on radicalization theory. Radicalization 
theory is the idea that the evolution of terrorism follows a predictable path (Patel, 2011). 
	 50	
Misunderstandings of what the radicalization process actually encompasses, however, influences 
local actors to wrongly identify potential terrorists and ostracize innocent members of the 
community. Scholars have repeatedly asserted the falsehood of radicalization theory by claiming 
that predicting which individuals will turn to violent extremism is difficult (Patel, 2011). Even 
the SIP declared that there is no single profile of a radicalized terrorist (DHS, 2011b). Multiple 
government studies have also refuted radicalization theory. 
A DHS-sponsored study found that there were 12 separate mechanisms that influence 
radicalization (McCauly & Moskalenko, 2008). These mechanisms operate in a variety of ways, 
but they do not follow a single trajectory (McCauly & Moskalenko, 2008). The Department of 
Defense supported the complexity of pathways to terrorism by claiming that it is challenging to 
predict individuals that will engage in violent behavior, because few individuals that have 
multiple risk factors actually commit violence (Department of Defense, 2010). Essentially, 
government research determined that there are mechanisms that influence radicalization, but that 
these mechanisms are fluid and do not follow a linear course. Even with solid evidence against it, 
elements of radicalization theory persist in law enforcement agencies’ CVE models, particularly 
in the NYPD and FBI. 
Further scholarship testifies to the difficulty in prescribing a singular terrorist profile or 
trajectory. Government agencies have put millions of dollars into research on radicalization, but 
there is still little consensus on what turns an individual towards violent extremism (Apuzzo, 
2016). The backgrounds of the dozens of Americans who have been arrested for aiding ISIS are 
vastly diverse. As a result, researchers were unable to draw commonalities among them (Apuzzo, 
2016). Despite the findings of multiple independent researchers and those sponsored by 
government agencies, the FBI and NYPD continued to ignore these results. The SIP declared that 
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improving the quality of law enforcement training was a necessity, but if the FBI and NYPD 
enforce misperceptions about radicalization, training efforts are moot (DHS, 2011b).  
The NYPD and FBI offered conflicting models to the scholarly research that disproved 
radicalization theory. The NYPD and FBI maintained that radicalization towards violent 
extremism can be disrupted in its early stages when law enforcement is trained and equipped to 
identify the signs (Patel, 2011). An NYPD report inspired many local law enforcement agencies 
to adopt CVE approaches based on the impression that radicalization is linear (Patel, 2011). The 
NYPD concluded that there is a four-step predictable path towards radicalization (Silber & Bhatt, 
2007). These phases are: pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization3 
(Silber & Bhatt, 2007). The FBI adopted an almost identical model of radicalization to that of the 
NYPD, asserting that there are four stages towards violent extremism: pre-radicalization, 
identification, indoctrination, and action (Patel, 2011). While the NYPD report admitted that not 
all of the individuals who begin on this path reach its climax of violent extremism, it maintained 
that there is a pattern towards radicalization, and that this process can be interrupted to prevent 
terrorism.  
The NYPD report is concerning, because the faulty methodology with which it was 
conducted undermines the legitimacy of its results. The study relied on only 10 case studies, and 
these cases were hand-selected by those conducting the study. The sample set is both limited and 
biased. By introducing a bias into the sample set, it is anticipated that the findings are consistent 
with their proposed hypothesis of a singular, predictable path. Therefore, the study imposed its 
hypothesis rather than proved it. Further, the report contradicts itself by claiming that there is no 
profile of a potential terrorist, but then identifies signature markers for each stage of the 
radicalization process.  																																																								
3 “Jihadization” refers to the operational planning of a terrorist attack (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). 
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The NYPD’s report also disseminated misperceptions about radicalization to be used by 
other law enforcement officials in local CVE efforts. The NYPD advocated increased 
surveillance and monitoring of Muslim American communities as a solution to radicalization 
(Silber & Bhatt, 2007). The recommendation of community policing and intelligence gathering 
decreased the trust required of partnerships between law enforcement and the community, and 
therefore undermined the community engagement provision of the SIP. This solution to 
radicalization is especially dangerous with the NYPD’s declaration that religious belief is the 
most telling indicator of violent extremism (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). By portraying religiosity as a 
symptom of radicalization, the NYPD indirectly claimed that more devout Muslims needed to be 
more highly monitored. This First Amendment concern was evident when the FBI ordered the 
spying of mosques in the Twin Cities.  
Reliable training is the first step to ensuring that CVE efforts are accurately focused and 
supportive of law enforcement and community relationships, because the circulating 
radicalization theory justified biases. By representing radicalization as a singular path, and 
claiming that strong religious beliefs are a precursor to terrorism, the idea that devout Muslims 
are inclined towards violence spread. 
 
 
Objective 3: Countering Violent Extremist Narratives 	
The third objective, countering violent extremist narratives, emphasized improving local 
communities’ capacity to challenge violent narratives, improving communication to the public 
about the national security strategy and misunderstandings of violent extremist radicalization, 
and building technologies to counter online radicalization (DHS, 2011b). Previously existing 
activities included consulting technology experts and media interviews (DHS, 2011b). The SIP 
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stressed focusing on building a public website about CVE and community engagement, speaking 
with former violent extremists, assessing the role of the Internet in radicalization, and creating 
technologies to empower communities (DHS, 2011b). The USGAO found that of the 8 future 
tasks included in this section, agencies implemented 2 tasks, 5 were in progress, and 1 task had 
not yet been addressed (USGAO, 2017). Due to legal barriers, action had not been taken on 
discussing online radicalization methods with former violent extremists (USGAO, 2017). 
The 2011 SIP declared that countering narratives that justify the use of violence is the 
most challenging area of CVE efforts, since it requires specific attention to First Amendment 
concerns (DHS, 2011b). Extremist ideologies influence radicalization, so how is this ideology 
effectively challenged without infringing on civil liberties? The ACLU raised concern about the 
potential for the government to censor Internet content to prevent violent extremist propaganda 
from reaching Americans (Gosset, 2011). Further, the United States Constitution is based upon 
free discussion and the marketplace of ideas, so citizens are free to promote their own speech and 
beliefs (Bjelopera, 2012). The federal government cannot outlaw a particular form of speech, in 
this case violent extremist narratives, so it must work to create a counter-narrative that is strong 
enough to challenge terrorist propaganda.  
The second challenge of this objective is how to define “violent extremist narratives.”  
The SIP defined violent extremism, but did not differentiate between the ideologies that this 
category does and does not encompass. Without the government having defined exactly what 
“violent extremist narrative” meant, local CVE programs were confused on which ideologies to 
focus their efforts. The SIP also did not officially assign the job of determining which ideologies 
were dangerous, but insinuated that the federal government would establish which ideologies 
were defined as violent extremist propaganda. Despite this insinuated responsibility, the federal 
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government never denoted which ideologies were designated as violent extremist propaganda. 
This portion of the SIP was ambiguous and without a systematic plan for definition or 
application. Deprived of a defined concept for the federal government to empower local 
communities against, this objective remained fruitless. 
Creating a counter-narrative rooted in American ideals was also left intentionally vague 
and ill-defined. This vagueness raised the question of whether creating an effective counter-
narrative is even possible. The language of CVE’s third objective was overbroad and confused 
the responsibilities of different agencies and the strategy for implementation. This confusion was 
reflected in the USGAO’s determination that only 2 of the 8 tasks for this section of the SIP had 
been fully implemented, demonstrating a need for more specified methods to execute this 
objective.  
 
 
The Lack of a Defined CVE Strategy 	
Despite the majority of CVE tasks having been at least partially implemented, the 
USGAO could not determine the effect of such efforts on security. Although the SIP outlined 
future actions and specific tasks for CVE, it omitted any form of timeline, definitive 
implementation plan, or potential methods of evaluating progress. As such, the absence of a 
cohesive strategy, which includes measurable outcomes, stalled the progress made and left local 
actors who were responsible for establishing CVE programs uninformed about the scope that 
their programs should cover. The lack of oversight of a multi-agency and multi-partner effort 
failed to address potential gaps in progress or inefficiencies in methods. Thus, the 2011 SIP did 
not develop a cohesive strategy among partners that provided both implementation regulations 
and quantifiable outcomes, which therefore weakened the potential of an effective CVE program. 
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Without a defined and cohesive strategy for whole-of-government implementation, local law 
enforcement was left to determine which methods to employ. Up to their own discretion, many 
law enforcement agencies adopted the NYPD model for radicalization, further perpetuating the 
stereotype that Muslims are inclined towards terrorism.  
 
IV. Impact on Arab and Muslim American Communities  	
 After the Bush Administration focused on surveillance and detentions, the Obama 
Administration embraced the concept of counter-radicalization as a new medium for 
counterterrorism. Radicalization indicates a psychological process where Muslims begin to adopt 
extremist views (Kundnani, 2014). Thus, radicalization assumes an Islamic origin. 
 In turn, the policing of the Muslim American community communicated to them that law 
enforcement agencies regard their community as suspect (Patel & Koushik, 2017). Such attention 
on one religious community thus became counterproductive to CVE efforts, because it increased 
the fear that law enforcement would exploit the trust of the community, and made the community 
less likely to consult authorities when needed (Patel, 2011). Further, CVE efforts created a 
contradiction: devout law-abiding Muslims who express their disdain for violence or radicalism 
were still investigated by local law enforcement due to their religion (Aziz, 2014). Thus, 
members of the Muslim American community assumed that CVE efforts were less about 
preventing terrorism, and more rooted in bigotry (Aziz, 2014). Individuals from Muslim 
American communities have stated that disparate community policing has led them to believe 
that the government perceives them as suspects, rather than as partners, in the War on Terror 
(Aziz, 2014).  
 CVE’s spreading of radicalization theory also influenced how Muslim American’s 
understood their access to civil liberties. The narrative that there is an identifiable path towards 
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terrorism is founded in two false suggestions. The first false suggestion is that there is a singular 
profile of those vulnerable to violent extremism, and secondly, that Islam is a producer of 
terrorism (Patel & Koushik, 2017). CVE outreach efforts perpetuated these false notions and 
insinuated a strong link between devout Muslims and violence. Therefore, Muslim Americans 
have indicated a fear that more observant Muslims’ free exercise rights are significantly 
compromised in CVE (Beydoun, 2015). Focusing on observant Muslims further threatened 
recent Muslim American immigrants, who are more likely to hold onto traditions from their 
country of origin. These recent immigrants are much more prone to live in urban settings that 
maintain higher levels of poverty. Additionally, Muslim American civic institutions are often 
mainly concerned with political and civil rights issues, such as preventing hate crimes and 
government surveillance (Beydoun, 2015). By adding poverty into the equation, poorer Muslim 
Americans are forced to manage heightened exposure to hate crimes, second-class citizenship, 
and diminished access to basic necessities on their own. Thus, there is a convergence of religious 
profiling and poverty in CVE efforts, which causes Muslim Americans to disparately receive the 
brunt of community policing and hate crimes. 
 
V. Conclusion 	
With the Obama Administration’s new way of thinking about the War on Terror, an 
alternative counterterrorism strategy emerged. The Administration’s strategy for implementing 
its counter-radicalization policy, however, was vague and poorly coordinated. Although the 2011 
SIP provided an outline for future efforts, it lacked a definitively scheduled plan for 
implementing and coordinating these efforts, and gave no criteria for measuring the effectiveness 
of the program. Without a cohesive strategy for implementing a whole-of-government 
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counterterrorism approach or an oversight mechanism, CVE remained ineffective in making this 
state more secure.  
Although the CVE program was well intentioned in its aims to improve relationships 
between Arab and Muslim Americans and law enforcement and to foster community resilience, 
the premise of the program was built on faulty grounds. Repeatedly, researchers have concluded 
that there is no linear path towards radicalization, but CVE programs were intended to identify 
individuals at risk of terrorism. It is a daunting task when the intentions of CVE and the 
capability of executing such intentions are paradox. As such, CVE introduced the narrative that 
the path to radicalization is indeed possible to stop, despite claiming that there is no singular 
profile of a terrorist.  
The notion that there is a linear and identifiable path towards radicalization, coupled with 
CVE efforts’ emphasis on Muslim American communities, established a narrative of Muslims as 
inherently more inclined towards adopting violent extremism. CVE’s lack of regulation again 
resulted in a climate of mistrust and suspicion. This representation of Muslims as potential 
terrorist subjects through community policing climaxed in an executive order by President 
Trump, which explicitly denoted that Muslims were a danger to the security of the American 
people.  
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Chapter 4: The Trump Administration and the Travel Ban 
 
“Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United 
States until our country’s representatives can figure out what the hell is going on,” – President Donald J. Trump, reading a statement released by his campaign4 
 
I. Introduction 
  
The Bush and Obama Administrations both utilized the “potential Muslim terrorist” 
stereotype to justify their security measures, but the Trump Administration adopted one of the 
most controversial counterterrorism approaches yet. The Travel Ban, rooted in Trump’s 
“America First” Doctrine, prohibits the entry of individuals from particular countries into the 
United States. The Trump Administration maintains that the ban is keeping terrorists out of the 
country (Exec. Order 13769, 2017). This claim, however, serves as a cover for excluding 
Muslims. This chapter examines the legality of the Travel Ban, and discusses how the ban both 
exploits and perpetuates the conflation of Islam with terrorism.  
 I argue that the Travel Ban’s reliance on barring individuals from certain countries from 
entering the United States is a counterproductive security measure that creates grounds for 
terrorist recruitment, alienates Muslims as inherently violent, and undermines U.S. relationships 
with allies. I will demonstrate how the Trump Administration has manipulated Americans’ fear 
of another terrorist attack to justify excluding a religion from the country. The first section of this 
chapter presents the Trump Administration’s “America First” Doctrine and its influence on 
counterterrorism policy. I then analyze the evolution of the three Travel Bans in the first year of 
Trump’s presidency, and the legal challenges made against each. Finally, this chapter evaluates 
the potential short and long-term issues that arise from the Travel Ban, and how the ban both 
undermines security objectives and marginalizes Arabs and Muslims. I demonstrate that the 																																																								
4 Johnson, J. (2015). Trump Calls for ‘Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering the United States.’ Washington, D.C.: 
The Washington Post.  
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Trump Administration serves to exploit fears of the “potential Muslim terrorist” while 
simultaneously fostering that narrative to justify its undemocratic and ineffective policy. 
 
II. A Controversial Counterterrorism Policy 
 
The Trump Doctrine 	
 During his election campaign, President Donald Trump established the slogan “Make 
America Great Again.” This campaign strategy later became the Administration’s guiding 
foreign policy doctrine (Easley, 2017). According to senior officials of the Trump 
Administration, “America First” is a commitment to protecting and furthering American interests 
while also strengthening partnerships with allies. “America First” denotes the renewal of 
American global leadership, a notion previously sanctioned by the Bush Administration, to 
endorse American security and prosperity (McMaster & Cohn, 2017). The Administration views 
the world not as a global community, but as an “arena” where countries compete for their own 
benefit (Wittes, 2017). “America First” is based upon three principles: that each country should 
prioritize the needs of its own citizens above all others, that leaders should implement policies 
that enhance their sovereignty, and that foreign actors will intervene and exploit countries where 
the government fails to prioritize their own sovereign interests (Turner, 2017). The Trump 
Administration commits itself to protecting and furthering American interests first.   
 This commitment to American interests was immediately present in many of Trump’s 
foreign policy actions. In exiting the Paris Climate Accords, Trump announced that he was 
putting working class men and women of America before foreign interests (Easley, 2017). 
Additionally, in a controversial move, President Trump declared Jerusalem as the capital of 
Israel and will be moving the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv (Libermann, 2017). This declaration 
was an assertion of Trump’s commitment to challenging the existing political order and 
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advancing his interests, rather than acting as a global mediator. Additionally, Trump’s nine-day 
visit to the Middle East and Europe, which aimed to bolster trade and commerce, demonstrated 
the Trump Administration’s promise to everyday Americans to improve the economy (McMaster 
& Cohn, 2017). Each of these actions signaled the Trump Administration’s commitment to 
changing political norms and putting American interests above those of foreign interests. 
Although Trump’s foreign policy agenda has been both contentious and widely debated among 
the American public and global community, his pledge to prioritizing citizens is also reflected in 
the Travel Ban.  
 In the first few days of his presidency, Trump signed an executive order that barred 
foreign nationals from specified Muslim-majority Middle Eastern countries from entering the 
United States (Exec. Order 13769, 2017). Known as the Travel Ban, it was intended to protect 
the American people from a terrorist attack committed by foreign nationals who were admitted 
into the United States (Exec. Order 13769, 2017). Trump’s Travel Ban adheres to his “America 
First” Doctrine by putting the interests of American citizens above those of foreign nationals and 
immigrants, and takes a hard stance against Muslims that both capitalizes on existing stereotypes 
and advances them.  
 
III. An Analysis of the Travel Ban 
 
Is the Travel Ban a Muslim Ban? 	
Early in Trump’s election campaign, he introduced the prospect of enacting a “Muslim 
Ban” to prevent terrorism. Announced in December 2015, Campaign Manager Corey 
Lewandowski stated that Trump proposed a Muslim Ban that would apply to all Muslims, 
including immigrants and tourists (Johnson, 2015). The announcement followed a mass shooting 
in Southern California, which the FBI believed had been inspired by ISIS ideology. In response, 
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Trump called for more scrutiny of Muslims, including those individuals who were already legal 
residents (Johnson, 2015).5 
While previously on the campaign trail, Trump called for additional measures to be taken 
against Muslims. Some of these measures included surveillance of mosques, barring Syrian 
refugees from entering the United States, and creating a database that tracks Muslim Americans 
who are already in the country (Johnson, 2015). The barring of all Muslims from entering the 
country, however, was his most harsh stance. Ibrahim Hooper, the National Communications 
Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations, voiced his concern over the dangers and 
biases the announcement would generate (Johnson, 2015). He warned, “One has to wonder what 
Donald Trump will say next as he ramps up his anti-Muslim bigotry. Where is there left for him 
to go? Are we talking internment camps? Are we talking the final solution to the Muslim 
question? I feel like I’m back in the 1930s” (Johnson, 2015). 
 From May 2016 to December 2016, Trump referred to the ban as a “travel” ban, and 
repeatedly explained how his newly proposed “travel” ban was an “expansion” of the previously 
publicized “Muslim Ban” (Bier, 2017). Trump’s campaign offered two reasons for the change in 
name of the ban: the negative reaction by the American public and government officials to the 
explicitly “Muslim Ban”, and the constitutional concerns expressed. In response, he stated that 
the “Constitution does not give us the right to commit suicide,” to express that although the ban’s 
constitutionality is in question, the ban should be permitted to prevent another devastating attack 
(Bier, 2017).  
As such, Trump reformed the ban to be based on geography, rather than an outright ban 
on religion. Particularly, he introduced “extreme vetting” as his new approach. Extreme vetting 																																																								5	This statement was removed from Trump’s campaign website, perhaps indicative of the Administration’s attempt to dissipate 
accusations of bigotry (Horton, 2016).	
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refers to the suspension of individuals from certain countries until the government established a 
more effective vetting system that would identify those individuals who believed in Sharia law 
and supported the use of terrorism against the United States (Bier, 2017). Such an emphasis on 
extreme vetting insinuated that a vetting system did not exist, despite the long and arduous 
vetting process that refugees were already subjected to prior to entering the United States. It also 
capitalized on the fear of Sharia law as a threat to democratic values and freedom. Trump 
continued to use the notion of extreme vetting as an explanation for his executive orders in the 
coming months (Bier, 2017). His recurring harsh anti-Muslim rhetoric throughout his campaign 
demonstrated that his Travel Ban is an alternative form of his proposed “Muslim Ban” that 
manipulates Americans’ fear of terrorism to justify its implementation. 
 
 
Executive Order 13769 and its Legal Challenges  
 
 On January 27, 2017 President Trump signed Executive Order 13769, “Protecting the 
Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” More commonly known as the 
Travel Ban, Executive Order 13769 attempted to prevent those with hostile attitudes towards the 
United States and its democratic values from entering the country to reduce the risk of terrorism. 
(Exec. Order 13769, 2017). Executive Order 13769 claimed that the visa issuance process played 
a significant role in counterterrorism efforts, and it aimed to improve this process to more 
accurately identify threatening or dangerous individuals (Exec. Order 13769, 2017).  
 Section 3 of Executive Order 13769 suspended the entry of individuals from Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for 90 days. This suspension was intended to give the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National Intelligence 
ample time to review and submit a report of countries that are deemed incapable of or unwilling 
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to provide the United States with additional information on its foreign nationals attempting to 
enter the United States (Exec. Order 13769, 2017). Effectively, this section prohibited foreign 
nationals from those countries from entering the U.S.   
 Section 5 of Executive Order 13769 adjusted the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for 
2017 (Executive Order 13769, 2017). This section suspended the entry of Syrian refugees into 
the United States until declared otherwise by President Trump, and claimed that the entry of 
Syrian refugees was detrimental to U.S. security interests (Exec. Order 13769, 2017). 
Additionally, under the Obama Administration, the average number of refugees admitted yearly 
was 110,000 (Carlsen et al., 2017). The Travel Ban reduced this number 50,000 for 2017, but 
gave refugees the opportunity be admitted into the United States on a case-by-case basis (Exec. 
Order 13769, 2017). Executive Order 13769 conveyed the notion that refugees, in particular 
those from Syria, and individuals from the seven listed countries, pose a threat to U.S. national 
security. 
 In the weeks following the announcement of the Travel Ban, protestors gathered at 
airports in multiple cities across the United States (Ellis, 2017). In New York City’s JFK Airport, 
large crowds protested the detention of two Iraqis on the basis of the executive order. Both were 
later released. In Portland, people carried signs that read “Portland coffee comes from Yemen,” 
to expose the hypocrisy of the ban. Demonstrators in multiple cities, including Boston, Newark, 
San Francisco, and Dallas, stood in solidarity with those individuals barred from entry into the 
United States (Ellis, 2017).  
 Government officials also took prompt action against the order. In New York, a federal 
judge blocked part of Executive Order 13769 by ruling that authorities could not remove 
individuals who arrived in U.S. airports from the seven barred countries after the order had been 
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signed (DeVogue & Watkins, 2017). Federal Judge Ann M. Donnelly stated that the removal of 
individuals from the airport is a violation of Due Process and Equal Protection guaranteed by the 
Constitution (DeVogue & Watkins, 2017).  
Two Massachusetts federal judges, Burroughs and Dein, capitalized on the power federal 
judges maintain within the checks and balances system to enforce a seven-day restraining order 
against Executive Order 13769. The judges’ ruling prohibited federal law enforcement from 
detaining or deporting immigrants and refugees with valid visas or green cards, barred extra 
security screenings of such individuals on the basis of the Travel Ban, and ordered Customs and 
Border Protection to instruct foreign airlines to allow immigrants on flights to the United States 
(Sachetti, 2017). The verdict permitted entry into the United States of lawful immigrants from 
the seven Muslim-majority countries included in the ban (Sachetti, 2017). Effectively, judges 
challenged the government’s ability to detain and deport legal permanent residents under 
Executive Order 13769. The Massachusetts federal judges made the decision based on a lawsuit 
filed by the ACLU on behalf of two Massachusetts professors, both of whom were Muslim green 
card holders from Iran (Sachetti, 2017). The two were detained and interrogated for three hours 
after arriving back in the United States from an academic conference (Sachetti, 2017).  
The next day, Attorney Generals from 15 states and Washington, D.C. condemned the 
ban as “un-American” and “unconstitutional” (Dovere, 2017). In a joint statement, they pledged 
to support the court orders that were issued the previous night by the two Massachusetts judges. 
The Attorney Generals were all from Democratic states (Dovere, 2017).  On January 30, 2017, 
Senate Republicans blocked Democrats from debating a bill that would rescind Trump’s 
executive order (Barrett & Cohen, 2017). Two days later, the White House announced through a 
memo that the Travel Ban no longer required legal permanent residents of the United States to 
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obtain a waiver (Gerstein & Nussbaum, 2017). This amended exemption of green card holders, 
along with the federal judges’ rulings on the unconstitutionality of the ban, demonstrated that 
there were major legal obstacles and widespread opposition to the ban.  
 On the same day, Attorney General of Washington, Bob Ferguson, filed a lawsuit against 
Trump, DHS, and high-ranking Administration officials (Washington State, Office of the 
Attorney General, 2017). Ferguson declared provisions of Executive Order 13769 
unconstitutional and filed a temporary restraining order that immediately blocked the ban 
nationwide. Ferguson maintained that the order violated the federal Immigration and Nationality 
Act, and the Equal Protection, Establishment, and Due Process clauses of the Constitution. 
Attorney General Ferguson asked the court to declare major sections of the executive order 
illegal and to bar the Trump Administration from enacting the policy (Washington State, Office 
of the Attorney General, 2017). Judge Robart of the Federal District Court in Seattle then banned 
the Administration from enforcing the 90-day suspension of entry and the refugee limit in 
Washington v. Trump (Liptak, 2017a).  
The government submitted a request to the Ninth Circuit Court to resume the ban, but the 
court denied the request and upheld Judge Robart’s suspension of the Travel Ban (Jarrett, 2017). 
The Ninth Circuit Court ordered Washington and the DOJ to file legal papers before issuing a 
ruling on the case (Liptak, 2017a). The three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit then unanimously 
decided to temporarily block the ban on the basis of the violation of due process (Savage, 2017). 
These legal challenges to Executive Order 13769 validate that the original Travel Ban 
unjustifiably targeted foreign nationals from Muslim-majority countries, and threatened basic 
civil liberties.  
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Executive Order 13780 and its Legal Challenges 	
 On March 6, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 13780, which replaced and 
nullified Executive Order 13769 (Exec. Order 13780, 2017). The order referenced how the 
implementation of the original travel ban had been delayed by litigation and legal challenges 
(Exec. Order 13780, 2017). This ban differed from the first in a few ways. In Section 1, the order 
removed Iraq from the list of barred countries, but maintained a 90-day suspension of individuals 
from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (Exec. Order 13780, 2017). The order 
stated that Iraq presented a special case, because despite having multiple active combat zones, 
the Iraqi government had taken steps to improve information sharing and travel documentation. 
The executive order exempted U.S. citizens who held citizenship in any of the six countries, as 
well as legal permanent residents. The ban on Syrian refugees was declared no longer indefinite, 
but the previous 50,000-refugee cap and 120-day suspension of refugee entry remained (Exec. 
Order 13780, 2017).  
 On March 15, 2017, U.S. District Judge Derrick Watson issued a temporary restraining 
order against Executive Order 13780, which prevented two sections of the ban from going into 
effect (Hawaii v. Trump, 2017). Specifically, Hawaii v. Trump prohibited the government from 
instituting its 90-day suspension on individuals from the six barred countries as well as from 
suspending the refugee admittance (Gonzales et al., 2017). Judge Watson ruled that the executive 
order violated protection against religious discrimination, and claimed that the order would hurt 
state businesses, universities, and tourism (Gonzales et al., 2017). Hawaii v. Trump claimed that 
the new Travel Ban was a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection, Substantive Due 
Process, and Procedural Due Process Clauses (Hawaii v. Trump, 2017). The case also declared 
that the ban violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and the Religious Freedom 
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Restoration Act (Hawaii v. Trump, 2017). Watson declared that when considering the 
President’s previous statements, “a reasonable, objective observer… would conclude that the 
executive order was issued with a purpose to disfavor a particular religion,” (Gonzales et al., 
2017). Effectively, Judge Watson challenged Executive Order 13780 by asserting that it 
intentionally and unduly discriminated against Muslims.  
 Attorney Generals from four other states, New York, Oregon, Massachusetts, and 
Washington, supported Hawaii’s case, using temporary restraining orders to halt the revised ban. 
They also challenged the ban on the basis that it equated to a ban on Muslims (Wilson, 2017). 
Ferguson, of Washington v. Trump, cited quotes from New York City Mayor Giuliani, who 
claimed that President Trump had asked him to come up with a legal way to ban Muslims 
(Wilson, 2017). These states supported Hawaii’s claim that the revised Travel Ban was an 
alternative form of the Muslim Ban that Trump had promoted throughout his campaign.   
 In mid-June, the Ninth Circuit Court largely upheld Judge Watson’s ruling from March, 
which declared Sections 2 and 6 of the revised order in violation of the Constitution (Jarret & 
deVogue, 2017). This ruling was another loss for the Administration, since the court ruled that 
the revised ban’s primary purpose was still to disfavor Muslims. The panel used the President’s 
tweets, which former White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer previously declared to be official 
statements by the President, to support how specific countries were dangerous, but that its 
citizens were not. The Ninth Circuit Court used the federal Immigration and Nationality Act to 
determine that the President did not hold the grounds to suspend the entry of over 180 million 
people on the basis of their nationality. The court maintained that the President could only 
exercise this authority if the government determined that the entry of a person or group of people 
was a threat to U.S. security (Jarret & deVogue, 2017). These rulings established that the revised 
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travel ban excessively burdened Muslim Americans, while also having wrongly defamed Islam 
as a producer of terrorism. 
 A few weeks later, however, the Supreme Court allowed for a limited version of 
Executive Order 13780 to take effect (Barnes & Zaptosky, 2017). The Supreme Court implied 
that the lower circuit courts had been too drastic in their rulings by completely halting the order, 
but also attached conditions for the government to its decision. The court declared that the 
government was prohibited from barring individuals with a “bona fide” connection to the United 
States, including family members, job offers, or college admission (Barnes & Zaptosky, 2017). 
The Supreme Court announced that it would hear arguments on the case in October before 
issuing a final ruling. The ACLU maintained that the decision only allowed for the “narrowest” 
implementation, but Amnesty International USA warned that the ban would rip families apart 
(Barnes & Zaptosky, 2017).  
 The Trump Administration interpreted the ruling to include American residents’ spouses, 
fiancés, children, siblings, parents, and in-laws, but excluded grandparents (Liptak, 2017b). The 
Supreme Court upheld Judge Watson’s ruling, however, and defined grandparents as qualifying 
as “bona fide” relationships, which therefore negated the government’s ban on grandparents. 
Along with this ruling, the Supreme Court allowed the refugee ban to take effect while the legal 
cases against the executive order ensued (Liptak, 2017b). In September, after the Ninth Circuit 
Court declared relationships between refugees and resettlement agencies as “bona fide” 
relationships, the Supreme Court supported the Trump Administration’s objection and ruled that 
“bona fide” relationships did not include those with resettlement agencies (“Trump Travel Ban 
Can Continue,” 2017).  
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Presidential Proclamation 9645 and its Legal Challenges 	
 On September 24, 2017, President Trump signed the “Presidential Proclamation 
Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United 
States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats” (Proclamation 9645, 2017). The 
Proclamation was a response to Executive Order 13780’s mandate for a review to identify which 
countries had inadequate identity-management protocols, information-sharing practices, and risk 
factors (Proclamation 9645, 2017). As a result of this review, the Proclamation identified Chad, 
Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen as the new set of barred countries. The 
Proclamation identified Iraqis as needing additional scrutiny, but the country was not barred due 
to the Iraqi government’s cooperation efforts (Proclamation 9645, 2017). The Proclamation also 
differed from the previous two Travel Bans in its indefinite suspension of the entry of most or all 
individuals from the listed countries, rather than limiting the suspension to 90 days 
(Proclamation 9645, 2017).  
 The government’s inclusion of non-Muslim majority countries, however, did not remedy 
its civil rights threats. The Trump Administration possibly included North Korea and Venezuela 
to ease religious discrimination-based challenges to the ban, but the ban still negatively impacted 
individuals from the barred Muslim-majority countries more than individuals from either North 
Korea or Venezuela. The United States receives almost no immigrants from North Korea, 
because the North Korean government forbids emigration (Somin, 2017). Additionally, the 
Venezuelan restriction only applies to a small number of government officials and their families. 
Virtually all of the people that will be largely affected by the revised ban are those from the six 
barred Muslim-majority countries (Somin, 2017). As such, the Trump Administration’s inclusion 
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of Venezuela and North Korea in the ban is a distraction from its still-present discriminatory 
nature. 
 The day after the revised ban was signed, the Supreme Court canceled its hearings on the 
previous ban in response to the issuing of the new ban (Shear et al., 2017). The Supreme Court 
dismissed one of the two cases against the Travel Ban, but did not act on the broader Hawaii 
case, which dealt with both the travel and refugee ban (DeVogue, 2017).  
 One week later, Federal Judge Watson of Hawaii, blocked the Proclamation and 
prevented the indefinite ban on travelers from the barred countries (“Hawaiian Judge Blocks,” 
2017). Hawaii argued that the revised ban was still a continuation of Trump’s intention to ban 
Muslims from the United States (“Hawaiian Judge Blocks,” 2017). In response, the DOJ filed an 
emergency stay application with the Ninth Circuit Court that would allow the Proclamation to go 
into full effect (Gerstein, 2017). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the Proclamation to 
take effect, but exempted visa applications with “bona fide” relationships to U.S. residents, 
schools, companies, or organizations (Gerstein, 2017). The DOJ then brought the stay 
application to the Supreme Court (Gerstein, 2017). 
On December 4, 2017, the Supreme Court ruled that the Trump Administration’s new 
ban could go into full effect, pending any legal challenges (“Trump Travel Ban: Supreme Court,” 
2017). This edict was the Trump Administration’s largest legal victory in regard to the Travel 
Ban. In January 2018, the Supreme Court announced that it would take up the Hawaii v. Trump 
case that challenged the latest version of the Travel Ban (“Supreme Court Announces…” 2018). 
Arguments before the Supreme Court are scheduled to begin in April 2018, and a final ruling on 
the ban is expected by June (“Supreme Court Announces…” 2018).  
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Potential Influences in the Pending Travel Ban Case 	
While awaiting a decision, the Proclamation’s ability to stand up in court must be 
considered. First, the Proclamation was produced after the Administration conducted a security 
review of various countries to justify their inclusion in the ban. The Trump Administration 
maintained that the countries on this list failed to meet “objective criteria,” and will be included 
on the list until they demonstrate their ability and willingness to provide the U.S. with additional 
information (Shear et al., 2017). This official evaluation of the countries could be deemed as an 
improvement to the screening process, which may provide the Administration with legitimacy in 
court for its selection of countries. Skeptics of the ban, however, conclude that the new 
restrictions are still based on countries and not individuals, which would present as evidence 
against the Administration’s case (Shear et al., 2017). 
Additionally, deciding the case on establishment grounds could prove challenging. In 
federal court, “injury in fact” must exist to prove religious discrimination or establishment of 
religion (Epps, 2017). “Injury in fact” means that it must be verifiable that the government 
discriminated against a particular individual, such as jailing or fining that one individual (Epps, 
2017). In establishment cases, “injury in fact” can be difficult to substantiate, because 
establishing religion can, in theory, unduly burden everyone equally instead of only 
discriminating against one individual (Epps, 2017). The Supreme Court has occasionally bent 
this rule when it deemed that the government’s actions either promoted or harmed a particular 
faith, but has done so less in the past twenty years (Epps, 2017). Muslims outside of the U.S. and 
without legal residency cannot make the constitutional claim against the government establishing 
religion, so current cases have relied on citizens to make complaints about the ban preventing 
close family members from entering the United States (Epps, 2017). Whether the Supreme Court 
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will deem these complaints a significant enough circumstance to rule that the Travel Ban is 
establishing religion is questionable. 
Further, the original Travel Ban included a provision that allowed for the acceptance of 
religious minorities from the designated Muslim-majority countries into the United States (Epps, 
2017). The Administration hinted at the acceptance of Christians from these countries, but the 
exclusion of Muslims. This provision was a major point of contestation in the first ban, and was 
used as grounds for proving religious discrimination (Epps, 2017).  Conversely, the Proclamation 
avoids such language and includes two non-Muslim majority countries, which could negate 
“illicit motive.” As previously noted, Trump had repeatedly stated that the updated bans were 
simply an expansion of his originally proposed “Muslim Ban.” Thus, it would be hard for 
lawyers to resolve that the most recent Travel Ban was not intended to exclude Muslims. 
Dissenters in the lower courts, however, have condemned the use of Trump’s campaign 
statements and tweets to prove his motive for the ban, claiming that elected officials’ policies are 
not necessarily reflective of their rash declarations as candidates (Epps, 2017). Despite the 
inclusion of the two non-Muslim majority countries as a distraction from religious 
discrimination, the ban has the potential to stand up to establishment challenges due to the 
difficulty of verifying “injury in fact” and “illicit motive.” The Supreme Court’s decision in the 
coming months will likely have a significant impact on the civil liberties of Muslim Americans, 
as well as on the way the American public views terrorism and Islam. 
 
IV. Impact of the Travel Ban 
 
Short-term Consequences 
 
Over the course of President Trump’s first year in office, the Travel Ban has taken three 
separate forms. Each version of the ban has been met with various legal challenges. Despite 
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these legal challenges, each ban has greatly affected individuals who were entering, or 
attempting to enter the United States. Figures on the number of people denied entry once they 
arrived in the U.S. were disputed, but as of January 30, 2017, that number was believed to be 735 
people (Kessler, 2017). As of February 1, 2017, one week after Executive Order 13769 went into 
effect, the number of people that were denied from boarding planes headed to the U.S. was 940. 
Finally, as of February 3, 2017, the State Department announced that the number of valid 2016 
visas that would be affected by the executive order was roughly 60,000 (Kessler, 2017). 
Effectively, the first and second travel bans prevented any visa holders from traveling to or 
leaving the United States for 90 days.  
 The Travel Ban also had a significant impact on refugees. Prior to the ban, over 2,000 
refugees were admitted weekly into the United States (Carlsen et al., 2017). In the first week of 
the ban, just fewer than 850 refugees were admitted into the United States. On average since 
2016, about 1,800 refugees from the seven countries included in the original Travel Ban arrived 
weekly in the United States. In the week of Trump’s original ban, only two refugees from those 
seven countries were allowed entry into the United States. Additionally, 45 percent of refugees 
admitted weekly in 2016 were Muslim, but once the ban was in place, only 15 percent of the 843 
refugees that were admitted were Muslim (Carlsen et al., 2017). The Travel Ban had a significant 
impact on restricting the number of refugees entering the United States, and dramatically 
decreased the number of Muslims admitted within the first week of its implementation. The 
Trump Administration justified these restrictions by exploiting the public’s fear of terrorism, but 
the ban also further perpetuated the stereotype of the dangerous Muslim refugee by explicitly 
excluding them from entering the U.S.  
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Potential Long-term Consequences 	
 The Travel Ban has strong potential to undermine counterterrorism efforts by feeding into 
terrorist propaganda. One of ISIS’s main strategies for recruitment is shrinking the “gray zone” 
of moderate Islam (Stern, 2017). The “gray zone” refers to the portion of moderate Muslims that 
ISIS attempts to recruit. To shrink the “gray zone,” ISIS focuses on making moderate Muslims 
feel as unsafe as possible living in the United States (Stern, 2017). ISIS manipulates the narrative 
that the U.S is at war with Islam to make Muslim Americans and Muslims abroad feel victim to 
prejudice and more accepting of terrorist propaganda (Stern, 2017). The Travel Ban’s focus on 
Muslim-majority countries perpetuates hostility towards Islam, furthering the terrorists’ 
narrative. This effect of the ban has serious long-term consequences of undermining U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts, as well as isolating Muslim Americans.  
 The Travel Ban also targets countries that are not responsible for terrorist attacks in the 
U.S. The 9/11 attackers were primarily from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, and the United Arab 
Emirates (Byman, 2017). None of these countries, however, were included in the Travel Ban as 
barred states. Additionally, since 2001, 10 fatal attacks in the U.S. have been deemed terrorism 
or tied to extremist Islamic ideologies, according to the Global Terrorism Database (Berman, 
2017). None of the attackers were from any of the countries barred by the ban, and most of the 
attackers were born in the United States (Berman, 2017). Other terrorists responsible for those 10 
attacks were from Egypt, Kuwait, Pakistan, and Kyrgyzstan (Berman, 2017). A New America 
report determined that the overwhelming majority of extremist Islamic terrorists in the United 
States have been U.S.-born citizens or legal residents (Bergen et al., 2017). As such, the Travel 
ban arbitrarily targets certain Muslim-majority countries, rather than focusing on the actual 
sources of threats to U.S. security.  
	 75	
The Travel Ban’s counterproductive security efforts do not address the issue of 
homegrown terrorism, which was a central objective of the Obama Administration’s CVE 
program. One of the United States’ biggest post-9/11 terrorist threats comes from a small number 
of radicalized Muslim Americans, known as “lone wolves” (Byman, 2017). Lone wolves have 
been radicalized with little direct guidance from ISIS, relying on online propaganda and 
grievances (Byman, 2017). The Travel Ban does little to address this issue, and its attack on 
Muslims perpetuates the idea that the United States is at war with Islam (Byman, 2017). Thus, 
the Travel Ban does not tackle the primary terrorist threat, but it further alienates Muslims 
without valid reasoning and fuels terrorist propaganda. 
 The ban also wrongly targets refugees. Syrian refugees have not been linked to a single 
terrorist attack in the United States (Byman, 2017). Of the 858,628 refugees admitted from 2001-
2015, only three have been convicted of planning attacks on targets outside of the United States, 
but none were successful (Nowrasteh, 2015). According to a CATO Institute paper, the chance 
of being killed in a terrorist attack committed by a refugee is one in 3.64 billion a year 
(Nowrasteh, 2016). These figures demonstrate that the vetting procedures in place prior to the 
ban were working. Trump’s discussion on the necessity for extreme vetting, however, gave the 
impression that adequate and effective vetting procedures were not in place. Rather, screening 
for refugees is an 18-24 month process, which is the most intensive screening process for those 
seeking admission to the United States (Jawetz & Gude, 2015). The entire process involves 21 
steps, and many of these steps contain multiple procedures. Some of the most notable procedures 
include several in-person interviews, multiple biographic and biometric checks, verifying the 
application with intelligence communities and law enforcement, health screenings, two security 
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checks, and even cultural orientation classes (Jawetz & Gude, 2015). Each step was carefully 
crafted to ensure that the applicants did not pose a security threat. 
Refugees admitted into the United States already face an intensive vetting process, but 
the Travel Ban further targets them for coming from places where terrorism is common, 
implying that all individuals from those countries are potential terrorists. Although many of these 
countries have a large terrorist presence, it does not mean that all of the people leaving the 
countries are terrorists. Rather than attempting to perpetuate terrorism, most of the refugees are 
fleeing from these countries to escape terrorist violence and suffering (Byman, 2017). Without a 
concrete explanation for why these individuals should be barred, the Travel Ban sends a message 
to Muslims in the United States and abroad that the U.S. does not like Islam (Byman, 2017). This 
misplaced effort again feeds into terrorist narratives that the U.S. is at war with Islam, further 
alienating Muslims and creating more grounds for terrorist groups to recruit. 
 The Travel Ban also has the potential to hurt U.S. relations with the countries included in 
the ban. The global War on Terror relies heavily on American allies, such as Jordan, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, and other Muslim-majority countries, to combat ISIS (Byman, 2017). The more hostile 
the United States acts towards these countries and their populations, the less willing they may be 
to cooperate with War on Terror efforts or with document release for vetting purposes (Byman, 
2017). It also alienates individuals abroad and individuals living in the United States who are 
from the barred countries, because it feeds into ISIS’ “grey zone” propaganda and makes them 
less receptive to local counterterrorism partnerships and efforts (Somin, 2017). Again, the Travel 
Ban carries severe long-term implications for U.S. counterterrorism efforts by threatening to 
undermine relationships with our allies and alienating Muslim populations, both at home and 
abroad. 
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V. Conclusion 	
 President Trump’s harsh rhetoric against Muslims began on his campaign trail, but its 
significant impact was recognized within days of his inauguration when he signed an executive 
order known as the Travel Ban. Throughout the first year of his presidency, the Travel Ban was 
updated and replaced two more times due to legal challenges. Each ban faced multiple court 
cases and rulings that questioned its constitutionality and discriminatory undertones. The Trump 
Administration’s current security strategy focuses on preventing the entry of immigrants from 
multiple Muslim-majority countries, and greatly reduces the refugee admissions cap. The 
Administration both relies on and feeds into existing fears of Muslims and terrorism to justify its 
discriminatory policy. 
 The most recent Travel Ban is currently in full effect, and the Supreme Court is set to 
make a final ruling on the ban’s legality in June 2018. With hearings beginning in April, it is 
unclear whether the Court believes the ban holds legal legitimacy. Either way, the tumultuous 
path that the ban has taken over the past year, coupled with Trump’s harsh rhetoric, ostracizes 
Muslims and Muslim-majority countries and threatens to undermine U.S. counterterrorism 
efforts.  		
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
I. Introduction 	
 The previous chapters have reviewed the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations’ 
respective leading domestic counterterrorism policies. Thus far, I have delineated each 
Administration’s approach to counterterrorism, exposed the shortcomings of the policies’ 
implementations, and the implications of such policies on Arab and Muslim Americans’ civil 
liberties. Amidst the confusion and urgency of 9/11, the Bush Administration enacted a policy 
that relied on punishment and preemptive investigative measures. The Obama Administration 
focused on addressing the perceived causes of terrorism. Although both Administrations had 
aims of securing the country, their policies undermined counterterrorism efforts and polarized 
the state by restricting the civil liberties of a minority. The Trump Administration capitalized on 
that polarized environment and ordered the Travel Ban, which prevents refugees and individuals 
from certain countries from entering the United States.  
 This chapter offers a more comprehensive comparison of the three Administrations’ 
respective security policies and the implications of those policies. First, I compare the fallible 
foundations and implementations of each policy, and how these factors influence the efficacy of 
the policies in providing security. Next, I draw attention to particular factors that policymakers 
must consider when drafting counterterrorism policies to ensure that the policies achieve their 
desired outcomes. Finally, I offer concluding remarks on the future of counterterrorism policy 
and the Travel Ban. 
 
II. Comparison of the Security Policies 
 
Inefficacy of the Three Policies 	
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 In all three cases, an abuse of government power has resulted in ineffective 
counterterrorism efforts, restrictions on basic civil liberties, and divisions within the country. 
While each Administration has differed in its approach to counterterrorism, their approaches 
have all failed to produce their desired outcomes of increased national security. These efforts 
have been unsuccessful due to two factors: flawed foundations and lack of strategic oversight 
during implementation.  
 
 
Flawed Foundations 	
Flawed foundations refer to the idea that the substance of a policy is ungrounded and 
inherently futile. Essentially, policies with flawed foundations are incapable of producing their 
desired results, because they are dependent on a concept that is fundamentally misleading. By 
misdirecting efforts onto individuals who do not pose a threat to security, the policies’ objectives 
never properly develop or operate. I demonstrate that the Bush, Obama, and Trump 
Administrations’ respective counterterrorism approaches distracted local law enforcement from 
securing the nation by spreading distorted perceptions of where efforts should be directed. To 
ensure successful and effective policies that prevent terrorism, efforts must be accurately guided 
toward the true threats to the country. 
Prior to passing the USA PATRIOT Act, members of the Bush Administration, 
specifically U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, made assertions that threatened foreign 
nationals as the government’s principal target in counterterrorism efforts. The USA PATRIOT 
Act relied on indefinite extrajudicial detentions, warrantless wiretaps, and ideological exclusion 
to direct its efforts at foreign nationals. Often, federal law enforcement utilized minor visa 
violations as justification for these investigations and detentions. Further, in the two years 
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following 9/11, the government detained over 5,000 foreign nationals, the majority of whom 
were from Arab and Muslim-majority countries. The government, however, convicted none of 
those individuals detained under the USA PATRIOT Act of terrorism-related activities (Cole & 
Dempsey, 2006). The exploitation of immigration status was a groundless and ineffective 
counterterrorism method. Rather than focus on true threats to national security, the Bush 
Administration misplaced its efforts against foreign nationals from Arab and Muslim-majority 
states, which undermined security and civil liberties. This focus on foreign nationals from Arab 
and Muslim-majority countries subsequently had many negative implications on Arab and 
Muslim Americans as well. Law enforcement directed its policing efforts onto Arab and Muslim 
American communities, which heightened public suspicion of the communities and often left the 
communities subjected to hate crimes.  
 When President Obama took office in 2008, his Administration attempted to shift the 
War on Terror away from punishment and surveillance by taking an approach to domestic 
security dependent on community partnership. To do so, the Obama Administration enacted the 
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program to address the root causes of terrorism. CVE 
included building expertise to help local law enforcement and communities recognize the signs 
of radicalization. Radicalization theory is flawed, however, because it relies on the notions of a 
singular path towards terrorism and of Islam as a producer of terrorism (Patel & Koushik, 2017). 
Rather, government-sponsored studies found that there is no patterned trajectory towards 
radicalization, and devoutness does not indicate vulnerability to extremism. Thus, CVE overly 
focused its attention on Muslim American communities, which both advanced the perception of 
Islam as linked to violence and ostracized Muslim American communities. Further, the Obama 
Administration’s focus on radicalization as a root cause still disregarded the link of radicalization 
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to U.S. actions, particularly its military intervention and foreign policy stances towards the 
Middle East. Therefore, counter-radicalization as the foundation of CVE was inherently 
unreliable, both undermining the community’s trust in counterterrorism efforts and polarizing the 
state.  
 Finally, the Trump Administration’s Travel Ban was established on the notion that 
excluding individuals from seven barred countries and limiting refugee intake will reduce the 
threat of terrorism. The Travel Ban is flawed, however, because it focuses on individuals who do 
not pose a significant threat to national security. Firstly, the ban targets the wrong set of 
countries. The countries of origin of the 9/11 attackers, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, The United 
Arab Emirates, and Lebanon, were not included on the list of barred states (Byman, 2017). The 
list additionally does not include the countries of origin of any of the terrorists that successfully 
carried out an attack on U.S. soil since 2001, nor does it address the issue of homegrown 
terrorism (Berman, 2017). For instance, from 2001 to 2017, there were 85 homegrown violent 
extremist attacks, 62 of which were conducted by far right-wing violent extremists, and 23 of 
which were conducted by radical Islamist violent extremists (USGAO, 2017). According to a 
New America Report, 85% of jihadist terrorists in the United States were American citizens or 
legal residents (Bergen et al., 2017). Violent extremist attacks have also been increasingly more 
deadly since 2009 (Bergen et al., 2017). Secondly, the ban was wrongly directed at refugees as 
the individuals responsible for committing acts of terrorism in the United States. Of the 859,629 
refugees admitted since 2001, only three, or 0.0000035%, have been convicted of planning 
attacks where the targets were outside of the United States (Nowrasteh, 2016). Thus, the Trump 
Administration founded the ban on the false assumption that individuals from the barred 
Muslim-majority countries were threats to national security. The Trump Administration’s Travel 
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Ban has flawed foundations that feed into the terrorist narrative that the United States is at war 
with Islam, therefore undermining its counterterrorism objectives while ostracizing Arab and 
Muslim Americans. 
 Due to the flawed foundations, the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations’ respective 
policies were all incapable of producing their desired objectives. Rather than focus on the true 
threats to national security, each Administration guided its efforts at the wrong populations. The 
Bush Administration failed to convict an overwhelming majority of the foreign nationals that it 
detained. CVE relied on the disproven theory of radicalization, which caused local law 
enforcement to wrongly place its attention on devout Muslim Americans. Finally, the Trump 
Administration’s Travel Ban did not address the issue of homegrown terrorism, but instead 
excluded refugees and immigrants from particular countries that have no substantial history of 
committing terrorism against the United States. Comparatively, each of the administration’s 
domestic counterterrorism policies were based on faulty concepts that misdirected law 
enforcement efforts and caused the policies to be ineffective.   
 
 
Lack of Strategic Oversight During Implementation 	
Similarly to how the flawed foundations of these three policies produced ineffective 
counterterrorism efforts and divisions within the country, the lack of strategic oversight during 
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act and CVE also contributed to such results. The lack of 
strategic oversight during implementation refers to the absence of consistent regulation or 
evaluation of the policy’s effectiveness. Without proper review of the execution of the policies, 
the government continued to sanction ineffectual counterterrorism methods. By providing proper 
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oversight, however, agencies are able to address the issues and inefficiencies that arise during 
implementation of counterterrorism programs, and therefore improve the programs’ capabilities. 
The USA PATRIOT Act focused on expanding executive authority and removing 
longstanding judicial obstacles to privacy intrusion and investigations. Removing judicial 
barriers allowed federal law enforcement to conduct counterterrorism-related activities more 
easily and quickly, which the Bush Administration deemed necessary in the urgency of 9/11. 
Without regulation or accountability, however, law enforcement efforts often disparately affected 
foreign nationals from Arab and Muslim-majority countries. The Bush Administration 
intentionally dismissed judicial oversight to increase the promptness of counterterrorism 
investigations, but in doing so, the Bush Administration permitted federal law enforcement to 
conduct their efforts in the manners that they saw suitable. Without oversight to evaluate the 
procedures, federal law enforcement relied on its own biases to routinely direct its efforts at Arab 
and Muslim Americans. These actions marginalized a population as inherently guilty, restricted 
civil liberties, and diverted the government’s attention away from true threats to national 
security. Additionally, a lack of oversight prevented the government from improving its 
investigation process and from convicting more terrorists. Therefore, the Bush Administration’s 
abuse of executive power and removal of judicial barriers during investigations produced an 
ineffective security policy and damaged public perceptions of Arab and Muslim Americans. 
Although the Obama Administration did not explicitly remove oversight from its 
counterterrorism efforts, its implementation strategy was overly broad and unregulated. In 2017, 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (USGAO) found no measurable outcomes of the 
2011 or 2016 Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP), because the government had failed to develop 
a definitive strategy for implementation. The USGAO maintained that the country was no safer 
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since the announcement of CVE, due to its lack of strategies for partnership coordination or for 
measuring effectiveness of its procedures (USGAO, 2017). This failure was especially present in 
the SIP’s lack of organized strategy for the first and third priority areas. These priority areas 
were dedicated to community outreach and countering violent extremist narratives. First, due to 
the lack of strategic planning, secret surveillance and intelligence-gathering initiatives tainted 
community outreach programs by undermining trust and partnerships among the community and 
local law enforcement. Additionally, the language of the third priority area, countering violent 
extremist narratives, was vague and did not establish a plan or assign responsibility for 
implementing that plan. Therefore, the Obama Administration’s attempt to portray Arab and 
Muslim Americans as partners in the War on Terror ultimately failed, as its lack of cohesive 
strategy or evaluation of the local programs caused CVE to fall into patterns of surveillance and 
mistrust.  
 Both the USA PATRIOT Act and CVE lacked explicit oversight, which contributed to 
the policies’ ineffectiveness. The Trump Administration’s Travel Ban, however, has received 
more extensive scrutiny from the judicial system. Various federal judges have continually 
checked the Travel Ban’s unconstitutionality. Major cases such as Washington v. Trump and 
Hawaii v. Trump have placed temporary restraining orders that blocked the ban from taking 
effect by claiming that it violated the First and Fifth Amendments. Currently, the Travel Ban is 
in effect and awaiting a final ruling in June 2018 by the U.S. Supreme Court on whether it is 
constitutional. As such, the judicial system is assuming its role as a check on executive power by 
disputing a discriminatory and groundless ban.  
 Without a proper oversight mechanism, the USA PATRIOT Act and CVE continued to 
employ ineffective and counterterrorism methods. The Bush Administration explicitly removed 
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judicial oversight of its investigations, but this lack of oversight caused federal law enforcement 
to abuse its unchecked power and biasedly implement its investigations. It also prevented the 
federal government from exploring why investigations were not producing terrorist convictions. 
The USGAO found that CVE’s lack of defined implementation plan and absence of evaluation 
resulted in unproductive programs. Both the USA PATRIOT Act investigations and the CVE 
programs had little positive effect on establishing security or convicting terrorists. The judicial 
system’s role in the Travel Ban, however, demonstrates that proper oversight can address issues 
that arise with counterterrorism policies and can ensure that they are not repetitively 
unsuccessful during implementation. 
 
III. Factors for Policymakers to Consider 	
 In examining the USA PATRIOT Act, CVE, and the Travel Ban, major concerns that 
arise regarding their inability to combat terrorism and their implications on basic civil rights. 
This thesis provides insight into the different factors that influence counterterrorism efforts so 
that policymakers can better identify potential complications and can enhance the effectiveness 
of counterterrorism policy while balancing the need to preserve basic civil rights. Each policy 
discussed in this thesis comes up short when examining their primary objective of making the 
United States safer. As such, there are factors that security policies currently neglect that must be 
considered to improve the quality of domestic War on Terror efforts. 
 First, counterterrorism policies must not neglect the weight of civil liberties and 
democratic values. Policy cannot curtail the Constitution or rule of law simply to expedite 
counterterrorism investigations. Checks and balances, such as judicial oversight of congressional 
laws and executive policies, exist to ensure that all Americans are guaranteed access to their 
basic freedoms. While much of the initial debate centered on whether foreign nationals and non-
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citizens also deserved access to civil liberties, as a result of the Bush, Obama, and Trump 
Administrations’ policies, the line blurred to include Arab and Muslim American citizens as 
undeserving of civil liberties as well. I also argue that liberties, such as due process, are a 
universal human right and not a privilege only afforded to American citizens. The value of 
national security cannot be negated, but impeding on the basic civil liberties of citizens or non-
citizens is not the solution to terrorism. Rather, sacrificing civil liberties only serves to 
undermine the foundations of American democracy, making the state less secure.  
 Policymakers must also consider the need for a clearly defined implementation strategy. 
This strategy must include clear objectives, methods to achieve those objectives, and a timeline 
for implementation and program completion. Implementation strategies must also assign a 
specific government agency or establish a committee for proper regulation and oversight. This 
oversight includes holding the agency accountable by regularly measuring the effectiveness of 
their methods. Without a cohesive implementation strategy, particular activities and objectives 
are abandoned in the confusion and urgency of counterterrorism efforts. 
 Next, policymakers need to be attentive of the potential for security policies to 
disparately affect a minority. As seen in the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations, 
counterterrorism efforts were overwhelmingly directed at Arab and Muslim Americans. 
Focusing activities on citizens, foreign nationals, and refugees from Arab and Muslim majority 
countries, however, is ungrounded and ineffectual. Explicit implementation plans also come into 
play here, as they serve to guide efforts and prevent local and federal law enforcement officers 
from arbitrarily projecting their own biases onto their activities. Policymakers must be aware of 
the potential for counterterrorism policies to demonize a population. 
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 Finally, policymakers cannot overlook the factors that drive terrorism. Government 
officials must examine the various influences that push individuals toward radicalization. How 
do U.S. foreign policy positions influence individuals from other countries or violent extremists’ 
attitudes toward the United States? What are the causes of homegrown terrorism, and how can 
they be addressed? These questions only begin to shed light on the complexities that influence 
terrorism, but they must be considered to ensure that counterterrorism efforts are effective and 
encompassing.  
 
IV. Implications for the Future 	
As explored throughout this thesis, each of the Bush, Obama, and Trump 
Administrations’ respective domestic counterterrorism policies fall short in their foremost 
priority of improving national security. Their flawed foundations, coupled with the lack of 
cohesive oversight and regulation during implementation, both disparately targets Arab and 
Muslim Americans and undermines counterterrorism efforts. As such, the counterterrorism 
policies since 9/11 have been ineffectual and counterproductive. 
Although it is easy to demonize the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations for the 
faults in their approaches, there is no easy solution to terrorism or to ensuring national security. 
Rather, policymakers must look at the shortcomings of U.S. counterterrorism policy to identify 
how to improve current policies, and to better guide future counterterrorism strategies. 
Recognizing the various factors outlined in this thesis that influence the efficacy of security 
policy is the best way to achieve War on Terror objectives and to make the country more 
defensible against terrorism in the short- and the long-term. 
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While the country awaits the Supreme Court’s decision on the pending Travel Ban, 
Americans and government officials must reflect on the future they envision. Since the 20th 
century, the government has repeatedly been blind to its own contribution to security threats 
against the United States. Rather than hold itself accountable, the government has assumed its 
own innocence in geopolitics, and has continued to feed into the grievances that terrorists 
propagate. Attention must be paid to the government’s historic imprudence in its foreign policy 
strategy to end the cycle of a boundless and interminable War on Terror. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 89	
Works Cited 
 
Agamben, G. (2005). State of Exception. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
American Civil Liberties Union (2009). Reclaiming Patriotism: A Call to Reconsider the Patriot 
Act. New York: ACLU. 
 
Apuzzo, M. (2016, March). Who Will Become a Terrorist? Research Yields Few Clues. New 
York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/28/world/europe/mystery-
about-who-will-become-a-terrorist-defies-clear-answers.html.  
 
Ashcroft, J. (2001). Prepared Remarks for the U.S. Mayors Conference of October 25. 
Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice. 
 
Atkin, M. (2013). Balancing Liberty and Security: An Ethical Study of U.S. Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance, 2001-2009. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.  
 
Aziz, S. F. (2014). Policing Terrorists in the Community. Harvard National Security Journal (5). 
 
Baker, N. (2003). National Security Versus Civil Liberties. Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, 33(3), 547-567. 
 
Barnes, R. & Zapotosky, M. (2017, June). Supreme Court Allows Limited Version Of Trump’s 
Travel Ban To Take Effect And Will Consider Case In Fall. The Washington Post. 
Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-
allows-limited-version-of-trumps-travel-ban-to-take-effect-will-consider-case-in-
fall/2017/06/26/97afa314-573e-11e7-b38e-
35fd8e0c288f_story.html?utm_term=.3dca8cbb7e71. 
 
Barrett, T. & Cohen, Z. (2017, January). GOP Blocks Schumer Moves To Rescind Trump Travel 
Ban. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/30/politics/tillerson-vote-
delay-immigration-order/index.html. 
 
Bergen, P. et al. (2017). Terrorism in America After 9/11. New America. Retrieved from 
https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/. 
 
Berman, M. (2017, June). Supreme Court Partially Restores Trump Travel Ban that Wouldn’t 
Have Kept Out Anyone Behind Deadly Terrorist Attacks. The Washington Post. 
Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2017/06/26/supreme-court-partially-restores-trump-travel-ban-which-wouldnt-
have-kept-out-anyone-behind-deadly-terrorist-attacks/?utm_term=.7291acfc0515. 
 
Beydoun, K. A. (2015). Between Indigence, Islamophobia, and Erasure: Poor and Muslim in 
‘War on Terror’ America. California Law Review (104). 
 
	 90	
Bier, D. (2017, August). A Dozen Times Trump Equated his Travel Ban with a Muslim Ban. 
CATO at Liberty. Retrieved from https://www.cato.org/blog/dozen-times-trump-equated-
travel-ban-muslim-ban. 
 
Birkenthal, S.M. (2013). Grand Strategy in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Carter, Bush, and Obama 
Doctrines. Claremont McKenna College Scholarship. 
 
Bjelopera, J.P. (2012). Countering Violent Extremism in the United States. Congressional 
Research Service. 
 
Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to a Join Session of Congress and the American People 
[Transcript]. Retrieved from https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.  
 
Byman, D.L. (2017, January). Why Trump’s Policies will Increase Terrorism—and why Trump 
Might Benefit as a Result. The Brookings Institution. Retrieved from 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/01/30/why-trumps-policies-will-increase-
terrorism-and-why-trump-might-benefit-as-a-result/. 
 
Cainkar, L. (2009). Homeland Insecurity: The Arab American and Muslim American Experience 
After 9/11. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Carlsen, A. et al. (2017, February). Muslim Refugees Were Admitted at a Lower Rate During 
Trump’s Refugee Ban. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/26/us/trump-refugees-muslim.html. 
 
CNN Library. (2017, August). September 11th Terror Attack Fast Facts. CNN. Retrieved from 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/index.html. 
 
Cole, D. (2008). Terror Financing, Guilt by Association and the Paradigm of Prevention in the 
‘War on Terror.’ Georgetown University Law Center Publications.  
 
Cole, D., & Dempsey, J. (2002). Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in 
the Name of National Security. New York: New Press. 
 
Council on American-Islamic Relations. (2015, March). Civil Rights Groups Concerned About 
Minneapolis CVE Pilot Program. Council on American-Islamic Relations. Retrieved 
from https://www.cair.com/press-center/press-releases/12821-civil-rights-groups-
concerned-about-minneapolis-cve-pilot-program.html. 
 
Department of Defense. (2012). Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood. Department of 
Defense Independent Review.  
 
Department of Homeland Security. (2011a). Empowering Local Partners to Counter Violent 
Extremism in the United States. Washington, D.C.: DHS.  
 
	 91	
Department of Homeland Security. (2011b). The Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering 
Local Partners to Counter Violent Extremism in the United States. Washington, D.C.: 
DHS.  
 
DeVogue, A. (2017, October). Supreme Court Dismisses On Of Two Travel Ban Cases. CNN. 
Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/10/politics/supreme-court-dismisses-one-
of-two-travel-ban-cases/index.html. 
 
DeVogue, A. & Watkins, E. (2017, January). Judges Temporarily Block Part Of Trump’s 
Immigration Order, WH Stands By It. CNN. Retrieved from 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/2-iraqis-file-lawsuit-after-being-detained-in-
ny-due-to-travel-ban/index.html. 
 
Dovere, E.I. (2017, January). Democratic State Attorneys General Vow Action Against Refugee 
Order. Politico. Retrieved from https://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-
immigration-attorneys-general-234338. 
 
Easley, J. (2017, June). Trump Cements ‘America First’ Doctrine with Paris Withdrawal. The 
Hill. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/homenews/Administration/336014-trump-
cements-america-first-doctrine-with-paris-withdrawal. 
 
Ellis, R. (2017, January). Protestors Mass At Airports To Decry Trump’s Immigration Policies. 
CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/us-immigration-
protests/index.html. 
 
Epps, G. (2018, January). The Supreme Court’s Travel Ban Dilemma. The Atlantic. Retrieved 
from https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/travel-ban-supreme-
court/551669/. 
 
Etzioni, A. (2004). How Patriotic is the Patriot Act?: Freedom Versus Security in the Age of 
Terrorism. New York: Routledge. 
 
Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 F.R. 8977 (2017), reprinted as amended in 8 U.S.C. 1182 (2017). 
 
Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 F.R. 13209 (2017), reprinted as amended in 8 U.S.C. 1182 (2017). 
 
Fox, M. (2013). The PATRIOT Act: Liberty Afire. Research Journal of Justice Studies and 
Forensic Science. 1(1). 
 
Gernstein, J. (2017, November). Trump Administration Takes Travel Ban Back To Supreme 
Court. Politico. Retrieved from https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/20/trump-travel-
ban-supreme-court-252672. 
 
Gernstein, J. & Nussbaum, M. (2017, February). White House tweaks Trump’s travel ban to 
exempt green card holders. Politico. Retrieved from 
	 92	
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/white-house-green-card-holders-no-longer-
covered-by-trump-executive-order-234505. 
 
Gonzales, R. et al. (2017, March). Trump Travel Ban Blocked Nationwide By Federal Judges in 
Hawaii, Maryland. NRP. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/03/15/520171478/trump-travel-ban-faces-court-hearings-by-challengers-today. 
 
Gosset, S. (2011). ACLU Lens: Obama Plan to Fight Violent Extremism a Step in the Right 
Direction, But… American Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved from 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/aclu-lens-obama-plan-fight-violent-
extremism-step-right-direction. 
 
Grimes, K. (2004). The USA PATRIOT Act: Impact on the Arab and Muslim American 
Communities: Analysis and Recommendations. The Institute for Social Policy and 
Understanding.  
 
Hawaii v. Trump. No. 17-15589, 9th Circuit Court (2017).  
 
Hawaiian Judge Blocks Latest Version of Trump’s Travel Ban. (2017, October). Fox News. 
Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/10/17/judge-in-hawaii-blocks-
latest-version-trumps-travel-ban.html. 
 
Henderson, N. et al. (2008). Policing in Arab-American Communities After September 11. 
National Institute of Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 
Horton, H. (2016, November). Muslim Ban Statement ‘Removed’ Form Donald Trump’s 
Website. The Telegraph. Retrieved from 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/10/muslim-ban-statement-removed-from-
donald-trumps-website/. 
 
Huntington, S. P. (1997). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New 
York: Touchstone. 
 
Jamal, A. A. (2008). Civil Liberties and Otherization of Arab and Muslim Americans. In Race 
and Arab Americans Before and After 9/11: From Invisible Citizens to Visible Subjects. 
Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
 
Jarrett, L. (2017, February). Setbacks For Trump: Appeals Court Rejects Demand To Resume 
Travel Ban— For Now. CNN. Retrieved from 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/04/politics/doj-appeals-travel-ban-ruling/index.html. 
 
Jarrett, L. & DeVogue, A. (2017, June). 9th Circuit Deals Trump Travel Ban Another Defeat. 
CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/12/politics/9th-circuit-travel-
ban/index.html. 
 
Jawetz, T. & Gude, K. (2015, November). Infographic: The Screening Process for Entry to the 
United States for Syrian Refugees. Center for American Progress. Retrieved from 
	 93	
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2015/11/18/125812/infograp
hic-the-screening-process-for-entry-to-the-united-states-for-syrian-refugees/. 
 
Johnson, J. (2015, December). Trump Calls for ‘Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims 
Entering the United States.’ The Washington Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-
for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-entering-the-united-
states/?utm_term=.3058bab966e9. 
 
Kessler, G. (2017, January). The Number of People Affected by Trump’s Travel Ban: About 
90,000. The Washington Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/01/30/the-number-of-
people-affected-by-trumps-travel-ban-about-90000/. 
 
Khalidi, R. (2004). Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints And America's Perilous Path In 
The Middle East. Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
Kumar, D. (2012). Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire. Chicago: Haymarket Books. 
 
Kundnani, A. (2014). The Muslims Are Coming!: Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic 
War on Terror. New York: Verso Books. 
 
Lewis, B. (1990, September). The Roots of Muslim Rage. The Atlantic. Retrieved from 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-
rage/304643/. 
 
Liebermann, O. (2017, December). Why Declaring Jerusalem The Capital Of Israel Is So 
Controversial. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/05/middleeast/trump-
jerusalem-explainer-intl/index.html. 
 
Liptak, A. (2017a, February). Where Trump’s Travel Ban Stands. The New York Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/us/politics/trumps-travel-ban.html. 
 
Liptak, A. (2017b, July). Trump Refugee Restrictions Allowed for Now; Ban on Grandparents Is 
Rejected. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-supreme-court.html. 
 
Malek, A. (2011). Patriot Acts: Narratives of Post-9/11 Injustice. San Francisco: McSweeney’s 
Books. 
 
Mamdani, M. (2004). Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of 
Terror. New York: Three Leaves Press. 
 
McAlister, M. (2002). A Cultural History of the War Without End. Oxford University Press 
(89)2.  
 
	 94	
McCauley, C. & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways 
Toward Terrorism. Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. 
 
McCrisken, T. (2011). Ten Years On: Obama’s War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and Practice. 
Royal Institute of International Affairs (87)4. 
 
McEnroe, P. (2015, January). Minneapolis FBI Refused to use Somali Outreach for Spying. The 
Star Tribune. Retrieved from http://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-fbi-refused-to-use-
somali-outreach-for-spying/290150151/. 
 
McMaster, H.R. & Cohn, G. (2017, May). America First Doesn’t Mean America Alone. The 
Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-first-doesnt-
mean-america-alone-1496187426. 
 
Naber, N. C. (2008). “Look, Mohammed the Terrorist is Coming!” In Race and Arab Americans 
Before and After 9/11: From Invisible Citizens to Visible Subjects. Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press. 
 
Nowrasteh, A. (2015, November). Syrian Refugees Don’t Post a Serious Security Threat. CATO 
at Liberty. Retrieved from https://www.cato.org/blog/syrian-refugees-dont-pose-serious-
security-threat. 
 
Nowrasteh, A. (2016, September). The Terrorism Risk of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: The 
Minnesota, New York, and New Jersey Terrorist Attacks. CATO at Liberty. Retrieved 
from https://www.cato.org/blog/terrorism-risk-asylum-seekers-refugees-minnesota-new-
york-new-jersey-terrorist-attacks. 
 
Obama, B. (2015). Remarks by the President in Closing of the Summit on Countering Violent 
Extremism [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2015/02/18/remarks-president-closing-summit-countering-violent-extremism. 
 
Patel, F. (2011). Rethinking Radicalization. The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School.  
 
Patel, F. & Kousik, M. (2017). Countering Violent Extremism. The Brennan Center for Justice 
at NYU Law School.  
 
Posner, E. A., & Vermeule, A. (2007). Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Price, M. (2015). Community Outreach or Intelligence Gathering? A Closer Look at “Countering 
Violent Extremism” Programs. Brennan Center for Justice and NYU Law School. 
 
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 F.R. 45161 (2017), reprinted as amended in 8 U.S.C. 1182 (2017). 
 
Sacchetti, M. (2017, January). Boston Judges Temporarily Block Trump Edict On Immigration. 
The Boston Globe. Retrieved from 
	 95	
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/01/29/judges-put-temporary-stop-trump-
immigration-order/UQiz2kEXJMDQHuiIFoguuJ/story.html. 
 
Savage, C. (2017, February). 6 Highlights From the Ruling on Trump’s Immigration Order. The 
New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/us/trump-travel-
ban-ninth-circuit-ruling.html. 
 
Shear, M.D. et al. (2017, September). Supreme Court Cancels Hearing on Previous Trump 
Travel Ban. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-supreme-court.html. 
 
Silber, M. & Bhatt, A. (2007). Radicalization in the West: Homegrown Threat. New York City 
Police Department. 
 
Somin, I. (2017, September). Trump’s Newest Travel Ban Order Has Many Of The Same Flaws 
As The Old. The Washington Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/09/25/trumps-
newest-travel-ban-order-has-many-of-the-same-flaws-as-the-
old/?utm_term=.3b841d63017a. 
 
Stern, J. (2016, March). ISIS Targets ‘Gray Zone’ of Moderate Islam. The Boston Globe. 
Retrieved from https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/03/23/isis-targets-grayzone-
moderate-islam/p9Uiv35DEnHSt7Fzk9SL1K/story.html. 
 
Supreme Court Announces it Will Rule on Trump’s Travel Ban. (2018, January). FOX News. 
Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/01/19/supreme-court-announces-
it-will-rule-on-trumps-travel-ban.html.  
 
Timm, T. (2011). Ten Years After the Patriot Act, a Look at Three of the Most Dangerous 
Provisions Affecting Ordinary Americans. San Francisco: Electronic Frontier Foundation. 
 
Trump Travel Ban Can Continue for Now, Supreme Court Decides. (2017, September). FOX 
News. Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/09/12/supreme-court-
allows-trumps-ban-on-most-refugees-to-stand.html. 
 
Trump Travel Ban: Supreme Court Lets Restrictions Take Full Effect. (2017, December). BBC 
News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42231806. 
 
Turner, G. (2017, November). Trump Shows His ‘America First’ Doctrine Is Model For All 
Nations.’ The Hill. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/360086-trump-
shows-his-america-first-doctrine-is-model-for-everyone. 
 
United States. (2001). The USA PATRIOT Act: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Justice. 
 
	 96	
United States Government Accountability Office (2017). Countering Violent Extremism: 
Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts. United States 
Government Accountability Office. 
 
Walter, S. (2012). Presidents and Civil Liberties from Wilson to Obama: A Story of Poor 
Custodians. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Washington State, Office of the Attorney General. (2017, January 30). AG Ferguson Seeks Halt 
to Trump’s Immigration Executive Order [Press release]. Retrieved from 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-seeks-halt-trump-s-immigration-
executive-order.  
 
Wilson, R. (2017, March). Fourt States Suing To Block Trump’s New Travel Ban. The Hill. 
Retrieved from http://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/323226-four-states-sue-to-stop-
trumps-new-travel-ban. 
 
Wittes, C. (2017, June). Trump’s ‘America First’ is America the Small. The Brookings 
Institution. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2017/06/02/trumps-america-first-is-america-the-small/. 
 
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. (2015). FACT SHEET: The White House 
Summit on Countering Violent Extremism [Press release]. Retrieved from 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-
house-summit-countering-violent-extremism 
